

# The Pelican Latin American Library

Jean-Pierre Bernard, Silas Cerqueira, Hugo Neira,  
Hélène Graillot, Leslie F. Manigat, Pierre Gilhodès

# GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF SOUTH AMERICA

South America is notorious for the violence of its political life. Army coups upset new governments with bewildering speed; intimidation, torture and corruption are widespread; the operation of 'death squads', in Brazil at least, has been confirmed. Nearly a hundred different parties in the ten major states bring instability, but also a peculiar richness, to the drama of local politics.

This *Guide to the Political Parties of South America* is a collection of ten essays which give a clear picture of the party set-up inside every South American state, from the Peronist circles of the Argentine to the Acción Democrática of Venezuela. These documentary studies, which have been updated for this Pelican edition, examine the history, organization, electoral strength, political programme and achievements of all the prominent parties. Their authors portray vividly the flashy demagogues and the breakaway groups, the militarism and the deep rift between conservatives and revolutionaries which characterize the political life of the continent.

## The Pelican Latin American Library

This series attacks current ignorance of an area where thousands thrive and millions starve and where politics lean three ways: towards the United States, towards national independence, and towards Marxist-Leninist revolution. Economic, political and even personal studies (of the whole region or of individual countries) attempt to fill in the background against which such men as Che Guevara have fought and are still fighting.

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
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United States if he fails to fulfil its requests. It appears that the US government has already retaliated by reversing a previous decision to give Paraguay a sugar quota. The resentment which this broken promise has caused may also be a problem for Stroessner at home.

At the moment the attacks of the Church on the one hand, and the worsening of United States relations with Paraguay on the other, appear to be major irritations for the Stroessner regime but do not seem to present any real danger. Whether these irritations develop into something more significant remains to be seen.

Alfredo Stroessner has already been proposed as the Colorado Party's candidate for the 1973 elections. It is likely that he will win, although, in view of the events outlined above, one is perhaps a little less confident in this prediction than one might have been three years ago. In passing, one must mention the formation in September 1971 of a Socialist Party composed of splinter groups from the Febrerista Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. It is, of course, too early to say anything about this new party. If it proves to be as weak in its opposition as the other parties it will present no threat to Stroessner.

February 1972

HUGO NEIRA

## Peru

### Introduction

Peru's emancipation from Spain left an emergent Creole bourgeoisie at the summit of the social hierarchy. Although this new dominant class chose representative democracy as the form of government (a mixture in equal parts of the French and the eighteenth-century American models), it was not able to reconcile this utopia of an egalitarian republic with the reality of *caudillos*, other colonial vestiges, and a complex system of social castes and interest groups. Either because it was obliged to preserve the existing structures inherited from the liberators after the wars of independence, or because it lacked experience in the government of men and things, the Creole middle class did not succeed in establishing itself firmly at the centre of political power until the end of the nineteenth century.

From 1827 to 1866, the period of the awakening of national consciousness (during which frontier problems arose and various attempts were made at a confederation with Bolivia), power remained in the hands of military leaders.

The subsequent brief period of economic prosperity arising from the production of guano and saltpetre was interrupted by a serious financial crisis (1868-79) and then by the Pacific War (1879-83), the result of makeshift and wasteful policies during the preceding period. Thus the signs of an energetic



effort to pacify and develop the country on the part of a coherent ruling class did not appear until after 1885, or more specifically from 1895 to 1919.

The economic and social climate in Peru suddenly brightened at the beginning of the twentieth century. There was a fantastic growth in exports that continued until 1920: the level of foreign trade rose from £6,000,000 in 1909 to £17,000,000 in 1915 and £32,000,000 in 1917. Politically this wave of prosperity corresponded with the rise to power of a new 'all-conquering bourgeoisie'<sup>1</sup> which managed to establish its hegemony until 1919. During this period, the new bourgeoisie controlled the Army and established the rules governing political activity, which was limited to clubs: the Civil Club, founded in 1876, and the Democratic Club, founded in 1888. The system worked, and legal governments succeeded one another almost without a break. Creole capitalism developed coastal agriculture for export, and stock farming and mining in the cordillera. The relative economic expansion which took place in these years was expressed

1. This expression 'all-conquering bourgeoisie' is taken from Charles Marazé's work *Les Bourgeois conquérants*, Paris, A. Colin, 1957. The reasons for applying this concept to Peru relate to the nature of this dominant class in Peru at the beginning of the century, and the control which it exercised over the centres of economic, social and political power. Indeed neither the English import-export companies nor the first American companies to penetrate the Peruvian economy were at first able to gain the upper hand over this national bourgeoisie. Moreover, the latter enjoyed considerable social prestige; it also controlled political power through a combination of a political club system and property-owner suffrage. In the 'Aristocratic republic' the same people had both the wealth and the power. On top of this, the material power was augmented by a 'spiritual' power – all the most important writers, thinkers and teachers of the period came from this class, notably the positivist philosophers Javier Prado and García Calderón. This national bourgeoisie merited the epithet of 'all-conquering' in that it put forward the first plans for developing the territory, and the effects of these were to be deep and lasting, especially in the Andean region of the interior.

ideologically by the appearance of an intellectual elite which was scientific, Comtian and pragmatist.

The Great War and the appearance of new forces on the Peruvian political scene brought about major changes in this situation, and in this respect 1919 is a crucial date.<sup>2</sup> The growing part played by American capital in the life of the country was the most direct consequence of the Great War and the opening of the Panama Canal: the United States replaced Britain in the role of chief customer for Peruvian exports. Not only did this fact transform the country's

2. After 1919 the power of the bourgeoisie was eclipsed. Although it continued to enjoy a monopoly of social prestige and economic power, it relinquished its political hold to other forces, to Leguía, then to the Army, to the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) and the political parties. This theme lies at the heart of any discussion of contemporary Peruvian society. François Bourricaud bases his study of contemporary Peru on the idea of an 'oligarchy faced with the problems of mobilization'. (See the Introduction to *Pouvoir et société dans le Pérou contemporain*, Paris, A. Colin, 1967.) Why did this dominant class withdraw after 1919 to become an invisible force, or, to those who prefer the term, an 'oligarchic' force?

It may be useful to draw attention to the following facts. After 1931, the ruling classes' criteria of legitimacy were called in question. Secondly, from that date a distinction began to emerge in Peru between the *dominant social class* and the *new ruling political elites*. The latter include the officer corps of the Army, trade-union leaders, the Aprista elite (at any rate until 1948), the leaders of the populist parties which have sprung up since 1956, and the intellectuals, who no longer belong to the dominant social groups.

The rules of the game and the political style adopted were thus worked out between the political parties (whose strength may be measured by elections) and the invisible oligarchic groups. This guide to political parties is therefore not competent to give a full picture of political activity. It ought to be supplemented by an analysis of the functions of this oligarchy and of the other semi-visible political forces: the Army, the Church, the freemasons, rural *caciques* and *caudillos* and so on. The importance of these considerations and the difficulty of dealing with them in the circumstances of modern Latin American society should not be underestimated.



economy, but it also brought a change in the behaviour of the local bourgeoisie: during the period of its alliance with American capital, it seems to have lost between 1919 and 1930 the 'historic dynamism' it possessed at the beginning of the century. A further significant factor, this time social in origin, should be added to this: the appearance during the post-war period of new social groups representing a new political clientele with new claims that found no echo in the preoccupations of the enlightened middle class's political clubs. These were groups which had until then been excluded from or kept on the fringe of active politics: the educated middle class emerging from the universities, the industrial workers of Lima and Callao, and the agricultural workers from the north. Great masses of people who had not until then been organized in parties suddenly erupted into the political arena. (There were labour disputes and strikes in 1918-19 for an eight-hour working day and demonstrations for university reform in 1923.)

Peruvian political life was profoundly influenced by these new facts. The political clubs disappeared (this is one of the reasons why, in contrast to the parties of Chile, Argentina or Colombia, none of Peru's present-day parties goes back to the nineteenth century). The members of these clubs and the holders of economic power nevertheless violently opposed the mass parties which now came into being and which attracted the intellectuals and the new, discontented client groups. Their opposition was expressed in a veiled, indirect fashion. The Apristas, who were to dominate the Peruvian political scene after the First World War, spoke of an 'oligarchy'; this should be understood to mean a regime in which the major decisions are taken by a privileged minority, without the people's consent. Between 1931 and 1956, the life of the country turned on the conflict between the Aprista Party and the 'oligarchic' power. The former attempted to win recognition and a full part in politics, and the latter to

regain the control it had lost as a result of the 1930 crisis.

This political impasse came to an end in 1956: the 'oligarchic' pressure groups were finally forced to accept a 'political staff' of Apristas, and the chief leaders of the party, many of whom had spent ten years or more in prison, became higher civil servants, deputies, senators, ambassadors, mayors and ministers. The Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) was allowed to operate in the open, together with its trade unions, its press, its radio stations, etc. This state of affairs was not even altered by the military coup of June 1962. Relations between the holders of economic and social power and the leaders of the Aprista masses were governed by a tacit agreement.

The most notable result of this agreement lay in the political continuity of the twelve years 1956-68. A further factor, reinforcing the illusion of balance and 'development', entered the picture, namely the favourable effects of foreign demand on the Peruvian economy. Since 1950 the country had enjoyed the benefits of an export boom, and the economic situation once more came to favour the agriculturalists of the coast, whose cotton and sugar products were in an advantageous position on the international market, the foreign mining companies producing and exporting ore (zinc and lead by the Cerro de Pasco company, copper from Toquepala) and the magnates of the fishing industry, which after 1959 became the largest in the world. Finally around Lima and Callao on the coast and in some towns in the interior the boom also affected light and consumer goods industries (textiles, construction, leisure services, etc.) through the stupendous urban growth of the past few years.

Peru thus gives an impression of some prosperity; its rate of development has been one of the highest and most regular in Latin America: between 1960 and 1965 the annual growth rate of the Gross National Product was 6.3 per cent, and the growth of income per head was 4.3 per cent. Again



in overall figures, the illiteracy rate seems to have dropped between 1940 and 1961 from 61 per cent to 37 per cent, and over the same period *per capita* income rose from \$120 to \$250 *per annum*. Finally, the population rose by 67 per cent over the same twenty-year period, from 6,900,000 in 1944 to 11,000,000 in 1961. The visible signs of this new expansion and general prosperity are the growth in the national budget, the stability of the currency and its rate of exchange with the dollar, and the major public works projects undertaken. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that these benefits have only affected participants in the boom sectors, and the abrupt modernization of the country accelerated the crisis in the traditional sector. A few of the main consequences of this disparity will be mentioned here, just to give an indication.

The first major consequence has been the migration of rural workers to the towns and the ballooning growth of shanty towns as a result: according to the 1961 census, 500,000 persons have thus swollen the population of Lima, and there are some 2,000,000 'displaced persons' in the whole of the country. Lima today is a city of 8,000,000 inhabitants, and is growing by about 250,000 a year. Peru's infant industry, the mines, the large agricultural cooperatives on the coast and the demand for domestic services in Lima are hardly able to cope with this massive influx. According to O. Dollfuss,<sup>3</sup> 'urbanization far outruns industrialization'. Secondly, the urban middle class has been affected by the rise in the cost of living and troubled by new aspirations to progress. Finally, the percentage of people affected by promises of imminent change over the whole country is continually growing, thanks to the process of homogenization engendered by the expansion in communications and information outlets. The emergence of this new public, awakened to the

3. *Le Pérou, Introduction géographique à l'étude du développement*, Strasbourg, 1965.

idea of a radical (but for the moment peaceful) change, resulted in the first instance in the birth in 1956 of new political followings, political parties, and professional politicians. Since 1958 other groups, lower down the social ladder than those who made their appearance on the scene in 1956, have succeeded in acquiring recognition in political life. Consequently the stability reached through the agreement between the PAP and the oligarchic pressure groups has been consolidated in recent years, thanks to the participation of new parties: Acción Popular, Democracia Cristiana, Unión Nacional Odrista, for instance. Nevertheless the party political system was still too narrow to accommodate the mass of the population affected by modernization who, because they were illiterate, were excluded from the suffrage.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Peruvian Political Parties*

This survey of parties begins with APRA, partly because it is the first in chronological order, but above all because a study of antecedents and origins of the PAP is at the same time a study of the antecedents of contemporary political life, since the PAP made its appearance at the same moment as the modern political forces it was to represent for thirty years. For this reason, we shall examine first the Aprista hegemony (1931) and then the multi-party system (after 1956).

There are other reasons why the PAP deserves particularly close attention. In the course of the long conflict between the PAP and the system, the rules of the game, the style in which it was to be played, the whole conduct of Peruvian politics were laid down – a combination of compromises, realistic agreements and rapid expedients reached in the face of urgent necessity. The characteristic features

4. However, the overall increase in the electorate should not pass without mention. In 1931, there were 350,000 electors, 597,000 in 1939, 1,575,741 in 1956, 1,692,744 in 1962, 2 million in 1963.



of Peruvian politics have been determined by the cynicism and experience of the 'oligarchy' and the realism and prudence of the Apristas, and these features reappear in the organization, aims and political style of other non-Aprista groups. The PAP, as Bourricaud has suggested, is not the highest factor but the common denominator of Peruvian politics.<sup>5</sup> Finally, Aprismo is a doctrine that is continental in its appeal and relevance, and has had its effect on other reformist movements in Latin America: the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Acción Democrática in Venezuela, the Colorado Party in Uruguay and the Paraguayan Febreristas. An analysis of the PAP is central to the study of the anti-imperialist movements of the 1930s that still play an important part in the politics of the continent.

Even if APRA had not had such far-reaching effects on the South American continent, the mere fact that it tried to develop an original doctrine specifically designed for Latin America, together with its tendency to reject European models, means that its point of view demands consideration.

Finally, the 'populist' parties that grew up between 1956 and 1961 are shown in the table, after the PAP. Logical convenience is given precedence over chronological order, and the Communist Party is therefore studied together with the other left-wing parties, some of which have grown out of it.

5. 'If we seek the great divide in Peruvian politics, the point from which problems of political mobilization begin to arise – mobilization achieved through a two-pronged attack, firstly a radical critique of neo-colonial society and secondly through a passionate statement of belief in national integration – there can be no doubt that Victor Raúl deserves very considerable credit for having blazed the trail. I shall therefore attempt to analyse the main themes of the Aprista ideology, and to see how the same problems are attacked and what solutions are proposed by the conservatives – whom I shall place to the right of the APRA – and the advocates of revolutionary violence – whom I shall place to the left of the APRA.' See Bourricaud, *Pouvoir et société dans le Pérou contemporain*.

### Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP)

Founded in 1924 in Mexico, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) first appeared on the Peruvian political scene in 1931, in which year it supported the candidature of its founder Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The APRA in Peru took the name Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP), and it is this organization that we shall consider here, not the continental movement.

#### *Regimes, Political Followings and Parties*

Years and regimes	Following	Parties
1860–95		
1860 Constitution: property-holding suffrage, restricted popular participation in politics.	Traditional clientele: urban bourgeoisie, workers on large estates loyal to their <i>caudillos</i> , merchants and artisans in the towns.	Clubs: Democrats, Liberal, Civil, Constitutional.
1895–1931		
'Pure oligarchy' from 1895–1919. Constitutions of 1919 and 1933: direct ballot, increase in popular participation. Illiterates not permitted to vote.	Appearance of new clientele: Industrial workers in Lima, sugar workers in the north, miners; students, intellectuals, urban petty bourgeoisie, merchants, school-teachers and so on. Political agitation in the native communities.	Parties: Peruvian Aprista Party (1924–31). Communist Party from 1928.
1931–56		
Period of hegemony of Peruvian Aprista Party (civil war and political deadlock between the PAP and the hostile forces of the right: Army, surviving political clubs, etc.).		



*Regimes, Political Followings and Parties (contd)*

Years and regimes	Following	Parties
1956-67 Multi-party system.	Appearance of new urban classes, entrepreneurs primarily concerned with technical development, migrants, shanty-town dwellers, industrial proletariat (mines, fishing, and the Lima and Callao industrial complexes). Organization of the peasantry into trade unions (tenant small-holders, peons, etc.) and their rise to political consciousness.	Parties: Popular Action, Christian Democrats, Odrist National Union. Movements: Social progressives of the revolutionary left (MIR), National Liberation Front.
1968 Peruvian 'Revolution'.	Military government takes power with support of Christian Democrats, Communists, a sector of Acción Popular, Social Progressives, and elements of the revolutionary left.	Parties: as above but without access to institutional power, parties tend to fade rapidly in importance.

## THE ANTECEDENTS OF APRISMO

From 1895 to 1919, that is to say during the period immediately preceding the birth of Aprismo, Peruvian society and the country's economy underwent a number of profound transformations. Heavy doses of American capital were invested in agriculture and mining; the war and the opening of the Panama Canal altered the rhythm of traditional export activity and suddenly increased the wealth of the Peruvian ruling class, bringing about a dizzy rate of development of the coast (and some areas of the *cordillera*), an imbalance between the various regions, and the first appear-

ance of a rural working class (Chicama, in the Trujillo valley) and an urban proletariat (Lima and Callao). A middle class was just springing up at the moment that the old parties and clubs of the nineteenth century were disappearing (e.g. the Piérolist party, the Liberal Club, the Civil Club). These social changes were not accompanied by any political change. The 1860 Constitution, under which only property-owners were able to vote, remained in force until 1933. The masses were therefore excluded from participation in politics.

APRA first made its appearance as a protest movement, as a campaign to win integration into political life for the new classes which had emerged since 1919 (industrial workers, white-collar workers, students), whose aspirations exceeded the programmes of the old nineteenth-century parties. The APRA ideology was profoundly influenced by the Russian and Mexican revolutions, which enjoyed considerable prestige. The Peruvian intelligentsia thus became land-reformist and Marxist. This ideology was moreover to be influenced by anti-American lines of thought as expressed by the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó (in *Ariel*), the Argentinian José Ingenieros (in *Las fuerzas morales*) and the Argentine Socialist leader Alfredo Palacios. This anti-Americanism gradually became more sophisticated in the hands of APRA, to develop into anti-imperialism. Finally, Aprismo was to become impregnated with two attitudes very fashionable at the time: the notion of the decline and decadence of the west (Spengler's book had an impressive response in Latin America), and a contempt for democracy, borrowed from fascism and bolshevism. The former of these notions had a decisive effect on Aprista ideology, which was concerned to dissociate itself from European models (Haya for example would refer to Indo-America, and never to Latin America or Spanish America); the second affected the very structure of APRA and its attitude. Finally, the effect of strictly Peruvian influences should be emphasized. APRA took over



the spiritual heritage of one particular thinker, Manuel Gonzales Prada (*Páginas libres*, 1888; *Horas de lucha*, 1909). Prada's teachings gave birth to the anarcho-syndicalism professed by the workers' leaders in the northern plantations, the Indian nationalism taken up with enthusiasm by the APRA and the intellectuals of Cuzco (Luis Valcarcel, Uriel García and others), the anti-clericalism active since the liberals of the nineteenth century (Laso, Vigil) and now revived by the democrats and subsequently by the Apristas, in a post-war period when organizations such as the YMCA, Protestant evangelical societies and the Freemasons were vigorously active.

#### FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT FROM 1919 TO 1931

##### *From Worker-Student Unity to the United Front of Manual Workers and Intellectuals*

This notion of unity between students and workers lies at the root of the origins and formation of the APRA. It is the result of the parallel development of the two groups, and the phenomenon of 'communicating vessels' created between them in the course of their political rise. A Students' Federation has existed in Peru since 1916, and since 1919 it has taken a lively interest both in the activities of industrial workers in the country itself and in the student rebellion movement originating from the University of Córdoba in Argentina. (The movement for university reform to change outdated methods of education was the expression of a socialist tendency in the new generation.)

In 1919 textile workers, on strike to obtain an eight-hour working day, called on the Peruvian Students' Federation for assistance. The students' delegate to the workers' strike committee was Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, then a student of literature. Closer ties between students and workers were

established as a result. The Federation of Textile Workers, which was to provide a number of leading figures in Peruvian Aprismo, was set up under the auspices of the Peruvian Students' Federation (FEP) and of Haya. In 1920, the Students' Congress of Cuzco called for the establishment of popular universities in which students connected to the reform movement would give classes for workers. These popular universities, which were a direct offshoot of the FEP, called themselves, significantly, 'Manuel Gonzales Prada Popular Universities'. They operated in Lima and Vitarte, both working-class centres. The courses included an energetic campaign against alcoholism among the working class. These courses were given the seal of official approval by President Leguía. The relationship established between Leguismo, the university movement and the infant workers' committees was to last until May 1923.

On that date, with the official consecration of the Republic to the Heart of Jesus (Leguía had sought the support of the Church to obtain re-election), the university students, student workers from the Popular Universities, anti-clericalists, freemasons and Protestants, anarcho-syndicalists and members of the YMCA congregated for a demonstration organized by the FEP, with Haya de la Torre at its head. The union of workers and students received a baptism of fire — one student and one worker (Ponce and Alarcón) were killed. A United Front of manual workers and intellectuals was set up and called for worker and artisan solidarity with the students. But Haya was deported to Mexico, and other leaders of the FEP and students at the Popular Universities followed him into exile.

##### *Birth of the Anti-Imperialist APRA in Mexico*

On 7 May 1924, in Mexico, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre presented to the Federation of Mexican Students a flag bear-



ing a map of Latin America, with the letters APRA embroidered on it in gold. The programme of this new organization contained five fundamental objectives:

- action against Yankee imperialism;
- for the political unity of Latin America;
- for the progressive nationalization of land and industries;
- for the international control of the Panama Canal;
- for solidarity with all oppressed classes and peoples.

The organization's aspirations extended over the whole of the continent. Cells were set up in Buenos Aires, Chile, in Cuba, in Puerto Rico, in Santo Domingo; in Europe, Aprista branches were opened in Paris and London. Progress was achieved in Peru, thanks to the trade-union nucleus in Trujillo (led by Alcides Spelucín and Antenor Orrego) and to the then cordial relations established with José Carlos Mariátegui and his journal *Amauta* published in Lima.

#### APRA – United Front or Party? 1928–31

Once the APRA had been created, its founder – and hence forth undisputed leader – had to decide between two possible strategies: should he launch the infant organization on the grandiose enterprise of creating an Aprista International, covering the whole of the continent, or concentrate all his efforts on Peru? Imperceptibly, force of circumstances pushed him towards the second option. But there was an even more pressing problem. Should the APRA be a movement of the oppressed classes, a united front, with no specifically party organization, or should it become a full-blown political party?

This dilemma was otherwise expressed in a personality conflict between Haya and José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Socialist Party (later the Communist Party), one of the most lucid intellects of the Latin American left. Mariátegui wanted the APRA to retain the characteristics of a univer-

sual movement, and set up a separate 'class party' in Peru as well. Haya refused to compromise with the Communists. This conflict, which was to determine the APRA's future, is reflected in Haya's own writings: reference may be made to his article 'What is APRA?' published in 1926 in *Labour Monthly*, and, for his polemic with Julio Antonio Mella (founder of the Cuban Communist Party) and with Mariátegui in Lima, to his two books, *Apra's Anti-Imperialism* (1928) and *For the Emancipation of Latin America* (1928) and his speech to the anti-imperialist Congress in Brussels, where he defined the APRA's position as hostile to the Third International. In 1929, the first steps were taken to set up a Peruvian party on the basis of the APRA. In 1931, Haya's candidature was put forward from New York. The dilemma was resolved thus: the APRA was to remain a movement for the continent, and become a party in Peru.

The most important political feature of APRA's incubation period is the appearance of new unattached political clientèles independent of the old political clubs – the northern rural working class and the university students, which after 1931 were to be given a programme and organization of their own by the APRA. Hence the leaders who were to direct the Aprista party machine received their initiation either in the struggles for university reform or in the workers' committees which operated hand in glove with the students and received instruction from them in the Manuel Gonzales Prada Popular Universities. The former group included the Aprista leaders Manuel Seoane, Carlos Manuel Cox, Serafín Delmar and Luis A. Sánchez, while the second group produced Arturo Sabroso (textile workers' leader and for thirty years boss of the Confederation of Foreign Workers), Fausto Posada (carpenter), Miguel Garate (a tramway clerk), Samuel Vásquez (a driver), Samuel Ríos, Fausto Nalvarte, Guillermo Conde, and others.



## DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1931

Two clear periods may be distinguished in this development: the first is marked by the conflict between the PAP and the traditional forces of the system (the last political clubs surviving from the nineteenth century, the Army, financial groups, fascist sympathizers, etc.); the second period opened in 1956, and is characterized by mutual concessions between the party and the system, a relative loss of popularity by the PAP and its assimilation into the established political order: this is still the situation today.

1931-56: *'From the Catacombs to Legality'*

From the moment of its birth, the APRA exhibited considerable political maturity; this fact is illustrated by the 1931 election campaign. A small group of exiles from the Aprista cells in Buenos Aires, Paris and Santiago returned to Peru and organized a party with 50,000 members. The PAP's national congress took place in Lima in May 1931, and the party's leaders, Manuel Seoane, Heysen, Luis A. Sánchez, toured the country drumming up support. When Haya de la Torre returned to Peru, he found a fully organized party waiting for him. The events which followed set the pattern for a political drama that was to continue until 1945: Haya made a speech in the public arena, in August 1931, before 100,000 persons; a group of Black Shirts supporting General Sánchez Cerro (who had overthrown President Leguía) made its appearance and formed a rival body to the APRA. Then followed the 1931 elections, in which Haya was just beaten; Aprista uprisings and demonstrations in Trujillo, Huanacavelica and the south; police persecution and the closure of Aprista offices and newspapers, Haya's imprisonment, a popular uprising in Trujillo on 7 July 1932 (a number of army officers were killed, an event which irretrievably

poisoned relations between the Army and the Apristas). In 1933 Sánchez Cerro was assassinated, probably by an APRA supporter. General Oscar R. Benavides then established his dictatorship and accorded a truce to the PAP. However, this only lasted a few months, and the party went back underground for a further eight years. In 1945, the PAP organized a National Democratic Front together with one-time supporters of Leguía and the Social Christians (both of which then constituted opinion groups only, and were not organized as political parties). In the subsequent elections the Apristas received 45 per cent of the vote, and a Social Christian lawyer, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, was elected. The APRA was immediately legalized, under the name of the Partido del Pueblo. The honeymoon between the new government and the Apristas was brief; after 1947 the situation began to deteriorate. On 3 October 1948 an attempted revolution by the Aprista rank and file failed, and instead a successful military coup installed a dictatorship that was to last until 1956. The PAP once again began to campaign for legal recognition. By giving their support to Manuel Prado, a member of the old oligarchy connected to a powerful banking family, who had fought pitilessly against them from 1939 to 1945, the Apristas finally succeeded in regaining legal recognition in 1956.

*Programme and ideology.* The programme of the PAP was finally defined during this latter period. The 1931 Aprista programme for Peru will be considered here, called the 'minimum plan for immediate action', to distinguish it from the 1924 'maximum plan' containing the five general principles mentioned above and on which the APRA was founded. This 'minimum programme' has not been appreciably modified since that time, and in its election programmes for 1956, 1962 and 1963 the PAP has been content to add or enlarge upon one or two points, particularly



with regard to economic development and planning. The 'maximum plan' on the other hand has undergone a profound transformation as a result of the ideological development of the APRA, under the impact of the Second World War, the failure of the PAP's experiment in sharing power between 1945 and 1948, Haya de la Torre's five-year confinement in the Colombian embassy in Lima, and finally the concessions made in 1955 to the liberal right (Peruvian Democratic Movement) in order to obtain the party's release from proscription.

*The 1931 programme.* The PAP programme contained a number of concrete proposals. With regard to the State, it recommended the introduction of a corporate system for Parliament, i.e. the inclusion of trade-union representatives; re-drafting of electoral boundaries on the basis of economic criteria (to do away with domination by parliamentary *caciques*); decentralization; and a new census (the last had been in 1876). The programme proposed the creation of new ministries: Labour and Industry, Agriculture, Mines, Public Works, Education, Health and Social Assistance. (Such ministries were in fact set up between 1936 and 1945 by governments hostile to the PAP.) The programme also demanded votes for women, reduction of the age of majority to eighteen, and separation of Church from State.

On the economic level, the two dominant features of the PAP programme were protectionism and statism. The Apristas demanded the introduction of anti-trust legislation, control and restriction of capital exports, and introduction of special legislation for foreign investments and the creation of a National Bank. With regard to the nationalization of foreign private industries, the PAP opted for a cautious line and recommended 'progressive' nationalization.

Finally, on the agrarian question, the programme exhibited some weaknesses: it did include the expropriation of the big

estates (*fundos*) but only after compensation, to be settled through a lengthy and complex procedure. It stated as a moral principle that the country must repair the wrongs done to the Indians, but hardly gave any indication of how this was to be achieved in practice. In fact, it was content to insist on the defence of small properties, and of the native communities (something already enshrined in the 1919 constitution), and on state supervision of legal disputes between big landed proprietors and their native tenants (*yanaconas*). In spite of everything, this programme did seem very left-wing at the time; it contains all the essentials of the Peruvian reformist philosophy.

#### 1956-67: From Coexistence to the Multi-party System

From 1956 to 1962, the Aprista Party went through a phase of *entente cordiale* with the political forces traditionally opposed to it. This was the period of coexistence (the *convivencia*). Was this a strategic move with the object of winning power (under Haya de la Torre of course) in 1962? Was it a symptom of the party leaders' weariness of so many years in hiding? Did it indicate a development in the ruling class's thinking, so that it came to accept the 'impossibility of governing against the APRA'? Whatever the underlying reasons, this period of coexistence marks the end of the PAP's hegemony. The party lost prestige with the university students and some sectors of the middle class, with the result that new left-wing political movements and parties appeared. In the 1962 elections, when he was opposed by six other candidates, Haya de la Torre only managed to win 32.98 per cent of the vote – just under the 33 per cent required by the Constitution for election to the presidency. The subsequent coup d'état is explained by the favourable impression made on the military by Belaunde Terry, and their longstanding bitterness against the Apristas. The PAP



responded with a general strike (in conjunction with the Confederation of Peruvian Workers) which failed. Resigning itself to the situation, it took part in the 1963 elections, in which the alliance between Popular Action and the Christian Democrats was victorious. This was the PAP's first electoral defeat.

Subsequently, however, a coalition between the PAP and the Odristas in Parliament managed to win control of the executive between 1963 and 1967, and to strengthen Aprismo. On the one hand, the two Houses exercised their veto against the adoption of certain bills (land reform, among others), while at the same time they dictated the distribution of public funds intended for the various provinces. Thanks to these funds, and to the provincial juntas administering them, the influence of Parliament and of the parties controlling it grew, at the expense of the prestige of the paralysed executive. As Haya de la Torre himself has emphasized, this was the period of parliamentary preponderance. The 1967 local elections, from which the coalition emerged greatly strengthened, demonstrated the provincial electorate's gratitude for the sums voted by parliament in the state budget to finance public works in the villages.

#### ORGANIZATION

At first sight, the PAP seems to have adopted a horizontal structure, largely for electoral reasons. The party's basic unit, the 'sector' (analagous to the 'branch' in the European Socialist parties), is the starting point from which a chain of representatives to higher bodies springs: district committees, provincial committees, departmental committees. The latter send four delegates (one for each region) to the national executive committee, the party's ruling body. However, the relative autonomy thus given to the departmental committees is only apparent. In fact this form of organization dis-

guises the true structure of the party, which is really vertical, and through which the control of the party machine is actually exercised. This vertical structure, a hangover from the period of proscription and a proof of the corporatist tendencies of the leadership and of their taste for hierarchical structures, is retained partly because of the need to control the Aprista trade unions, and partly because it ensures greater efficiency and guarantees survival in times of persecution.

The leaders of the party are appointed democratically, and must have made their career in the party. Sometimes Apristas become 'professional politicians'. The national executive committee, which is re-elected at each party Congress, elects a General Secretary. But the whole of this hierarchy is dominated by the personality and influence of Haya de la Torre, the party's 'supreme head' and 'guide'.

#### *Vertical and Horizontal Chains of Command*

All the Aprista militants (who call each other 'companion' to distinguish themselves from the Communist 'comrades') belong to two basic units at once: the 'branch' of their own locality, and the 'cell' at their place of work. The cells are in turn grouped into 'commands' – thus there is a workers' command, a students' command, and commands of teachers, bankers, doctors and so on. These receive their instructions from the national executive committee, directly supervised by Haya. The mystery in which the work of these groups is shrouded, and their great efficiency, have produced excellent results, but at the same time have given the PAP a somewhat sinister reputation as a fascist party.

Because of this organizational structure, the structure of the national executive committee itself is extremely complex. On the one hand, its twenty bureaux or political secretariats coordinate the activities of other bodies throughout the coun-



try through the medium of the departmental committees. On the other hand, it has ties with entities such as the Aprista Parliamentary Group (which consists of the party's deputies and senators), the various commands and the Peruvian Aprista Youth.

The party's line is laid down by party conventions and plenary assemblies on which the leaders of professional and trade-union branches and local branch delegates are all represented. The Apristas have held seven National Congresses (the most important of which took place in 1931, 1948, 1959 and 1962), and a much greater number of conventions. In recent years the post of PAP General Secretary has been bitterly contested; it has grown in importance recently because of Haya's frequent trips abroad, and if Haya should disappear from the scene altogether the General Secretary would take over as leader of the party.

#### *The Leader's Role*

The above account gives the impression that the PAP is a modern party, firmly entrenched with a strong chain of command. Yet the overriding influence exerted by Haya within the organization demonstrates that caudillism has not been eliminated from it, but has rather taken a new form: it is exercised in the framework of a well-oiled political machine. The leader's personal charisma places him above the internal discussions between the different wings of the party. It enables him to get rid of party leaders that he does not want (on three occasions, in 1932, 1934 and 1942, he has dissolved the national executive committee on his own authority) and get the plenary assemblies to elect the leaders of his choice by persuasion (as in the case of elections to the post of General Secretary). There is no indication that Haya's influence on the party machine has in any way diminished.

### APRISMO IN THE LIFE OF A NATION

#### *Areas of Support*

Although the PAP is organized on a national scale, since it has a political office (or 'house of the people') in every departmental capital, its electoral support is very unevenly distributed. It is strongly entrenched in the north, is losing ground in the centre of the country (although towns like Huancaayo are still Aprista strongholds), and is weak in the south, a backward region with a Quechua majority; in Lima its power is also small. The PAP's prime characteristic from the electoral point of view, therefore, is its great strength in the northern departments, that is to say in the most highly developed and literate region of the country (with the exception of Lima). Election results in the departments of La Libertad, Cajamarca, Ancash, Lambayeque, Huanuco and San Martín have always been so favourable to the PAP that the Apristas have called these departments 'the loyal north'. In fact ever since 1931 and in the elections of 1945, 1962 and 1963 the north's loyalty to the PAP has been one of the few constant factors in the development of the Peruvian electorate.

Within the framework of the present electoral system, which favours the areas of high literacy, this situation gives the PAP considerable advantages. Electorally the votes the Apristas win in the north compensate for the deficiencies in their vote in other regions (witness the 1962 elections). In trade-union affairs, the high level of agricultural and industrial development in the north (especially on the coast, where there are large sugar plantations, oil in Piura, fish-meal and iron at Chimbote) has meant a high level of trade-union organization, both in the country and the towns, and these unions are guided and led by the Aprista leadership. The PAP's political hegemony in both the electoral and trade-



union sphere is thus the direct result of the party's good fortune in having established a firm base of popular support in a region which has only become developed within the last thirty years.

#### *Following*

One major question arises: why is the north so attached to the PAP? The fact that Haya de la Torre was born in Trujillo, capital of the department of La Libertad, is not enough to explain this phenomenon. At the time of the APRA's revolutionary baptism, the north already provided its toughest activists and was the scene of the most dramatic episodes in its early existence (when 6,000 Apristas were killed around the ancient pre-Colombian fortress of Chan-Chan in the revolutions of 1932-3), but this again only begs the question. Why was it this particular region that proved so receptive to the APRA's message? The answer may be found by an examination of the party's following and its ideology. Its following consisted of agricultural workers on the big sugar plantations (Grace and Gildemeister) who were receptive to the PAP's early anti-imperialist propaganda; petroleum workers; the small rice-growers of Lambayeque; the peasant communities like those of Chepen and Moche; merchants and new middle-class people in the prosperous coastal towns; migratory workers who would come down to the coast from Cajamarca; intellectuals and 'decent folk' (*gente decente*) whose standard of living had been affected by the unfavourable economic climate of the 1930-5 period. All these groups together constituted a social amalgam whose aspirations the PAP had been able to exploit. These aspirations were expressed in cooperativism, a desire for national and local development, a desire to see foreign investments controlled, and supplemented by a heavy dose of regionalism and class feeling.

A mutual aid system has subsequently been established between the party and its following; some groups of workers, the petroleum workers and some agricultural labourers for example, have been able to improve their standard of living thanks to Aprista trade-union action. In return, the PAP's popular following votes faithfully for the party and substantially augments its funds with party subscriptions.

*Party Following in the Centre and South.* Despite the large population in the centre and south of the country, its electoral weight is small: 300,000 votes out of a total of 2,000,000 in 1963. (The two regions with the largest number of electors are the north, with 683,000 voters, and Lima with 900,000.)

The PAP's following in the centre and south, in contrast to the north, is not recruited from among the agricultural and industrial workers, but from the lower middle class in the urban and tertiary sectors (especially school teachers and white-collar workers) and even the big landowning class. Whereas the great majority of the native peasantry (tenants on the big estates or peasant smallholders) are indifferent and sometimes even hostile to the PAP, as is the case in the Cuzco region, some more prosperous and sophisticated native communities in the region of Junín and Pasco are sympathetic to the Apristas.

The variegation of its following from region to region and even within departments presents the PAP with considerable problems of coordination which other political groups do not have to face. The party consequently attaches great importance to its regional and departmental branches, since its political strategy, based on the aspirations of different if not mutually antagonistic kinds of followers, is utterly dependent on their flexibility of approach.

*Lima - a Special Case.* The capital, which accounts for 42 per cent of the national electorate, has for some years been hostile



to the PAP. In 1962, Haya de la Torre only managed to come third in Lima, with 164,000 votes, preceded by Fernando Belaunde Terry (207,000 votes) and General Odría (234,000 votes); the respective positions of the three candidates in Lima was precisely the reverse of that which they occupied over the country as a whole. In 1963, Belaunde took first place from General Odría, while Haya came second, thus losing in the capital the advantage he was assured of by the 'loyal north'.

These electoral reverses date from fairly recent times: in 1945 and 1956, Lima had in fact supported candidates put up by the PAP. Lima's anti-Aprismo is probably due to the hostility of the mass of communications media (newspapers and television) to the PAP; the present composition of the city's population, with its 45 per cent of uprooted provincials sympathetic to an authoritarian line as represented by General Odría; the appearance of a new proletariat opposed to the reformism of the CTP's Aprista leadership, and of a middle class of similarly recent origin (consisting for the most part of professional people) which, in contrast, rejects the PAP's violent past; and finally by the political weight of the traditional sector of the population which still regards this party as the incarnation of provincial hostility to the capital and the cause of the people's irruption into its politics.

#### *Electoral Strength*

*The Problem of the Aprista Vote.* While they were excluded from legal political activity, the Apristas on several occasions supported independent candidates, both for parliament and the presidency, thus becoming for many years the arbiters of electoral life. This makes the study of the Aprista electorate no easier, since it thus becomes confused with that of other, smaller organizations. This happened most notably in the




Figure 15. Votes Cast for the PAP in July 1963

elections of 1945 and 1956, when the then banned PAP supported the candidature of José Luis Bustamante and Manuel Prado, respectively, carrying both of them to the presidency.

Whether it be due to the appearance of new political for-



mations or to the apathy of the Aprista electorate, the party's support steadily fell from 1956 onwards.

Election	Percentage of the Aprista vote
1945	45
1956	42.87
1962	32.98
1963	34.35

The slight improvement registered in 1963 is due to the drop in the number of candidates (four instead of seven in 1962) which made for a greater concentration of votes.

**Election Results.** The Aprista vote may be studied by comparing it with that of the most powerful political group which contested first place with the PAP after 1965 – the Popular Action Party.

*Election Results of the PAP and the AP  
for 1956-63 Compared*

Election	Peruvian Aprista Party		Popular Action Party	
	Votes	%	Votes	%
1956	567,713	42.87	457,966	34.58
1962	558,276	32.98	543,828	32.12
1963	623,501	34.35	708,662	36.26
1963 <sup>6</sup>	712,122	33.98	747,750	35.68

#### *Trade-union Strength*

With two hundred and forty thousand members, the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP), controlled by the PAP, is the country's biggest trade-union organization. For many years, the Aprista unions were both the instrument through which the new working class made its social claims, and the PAP's best pressure group, mobilized by the party

6. Local elections.

with the object of achieving its return to legality or to impose its demands on the political scene. However, this very fact, that the CTP was being used for political ends, was the organization's great weakness. After 1958, the Aprista trade-union leadership was faced with serious internal disputes which lessened its power on both the trade-union and the political level.

The CTP was born in 1939 out of the old General Confederation of Peruvian Workers, founded by the Socialist José C. Mariátegui. A ruling nucleus consisting of anarcho-syndicalist workers quickly emerged, and this group affiliated to the PAP after 1931 (they included Arturo Sabroso, who was General Secretary of the CTP for twenty-five years). In 1945 the CTP became the Apristas' trade-union arm. The life of the organization ran parallel to that of the party: banned from 1948 to 1952, it gradually built itself up from that time on and won back recognition in 1956. At that time, however, the tacit agreement made between the PAP and the Manuel Prado regime ('coexistence', which went further than a simple electoral pact) forced the CTP to support a working-class policy that was against its own interests. This could not have happened at a worse time, for a number of industrial strikes declared 'illegal' by the regime broke out just at this moment, and the CTP found itself in a position where it was unable to support them; the peasants invaded the big estates, and government repression of these outbreaks was exceptionally severe (a record number of workers and peasants were killed in clashes with the police). The CTP was completely stymied; on the one hand, it could not express approval of the regime's reactionary policies, since this would produce strong protests from its members; on the other hand, it could not disavow the government's actions either, for fear of providing a new pretext for preventing the PAP from coming to power. As a result, a number of regional trade-union organizations broke with the CTP in



1958: the Arequipa regional federation, the regional federations of Puno and Cuzco, the Building Union and Federation in Lima, and the very large Peruvian Peasants' Confederation. This regionalist movement was led by the Communist Party. All subsequent attempts by the CTP Apristas or by the various local union headquarters and the unions which left the movement at the time of Prado to reunite the trade-union movement to their own advantage have failed.

As a result, the most moderate and best-organized unions belonging to the biggest production sectors are the ones which have remained in the CTP. These unions are affiliated to the CTP through their trade federations, under the control of the PAP: the Federation of Sugar Workers (35,000 members), the Federation of Petroleum Workers (10,000 members), the federations of textile workers, school-teachers, transport workers, bank employees and so on. However, strike calls put out by the Confederation are not always respected. Hence the call for a general strike put out by the CTP in July 1962 in response to the military coup was fully obeyed in the north, only partly in Lima and Callao, and ignored by the regional headquarters in the rest of the country. This resulted in the failure of the strike.

### The Populist Parties

The parties which came into being between 1956 and 1961 may be included in this category. They have been given this label and grouped together here for several reasons. First of all because these are parties with a highly variegated following, born out of the prestige won by a powerful personality, and whose electoral support is principally urban. Secondly, because they represent the new social forces which have appeared in Peru during the years of economic expansion

following 1956, years characterized by accelerated urbanization and the growth of the tertiary and industrial sectors. Lastly, because these parties are in reality nothing but electoral machines; they frequently give the impression that they define themselves principally in terms of a team able to carry through any given programme, the programme and ideology themselves being merely secondary considerations.

The parties here included in the category of populist parties are the Popular Action Party, the Odrista National Union, Christian Democracy, and the Social Progressive Party. The first two have managed to become big national parties, while the two latter have remained satellite parties, consisting largely of party officers and with little mass support. All these groups may be clearly distinguished from the APRA on the one hand (which since the Second World War has come rather to resemble European social democracy, because of its long-standing working class support), and, on the other hand, from the extreme left-wing groups and parties.

The appearance of populism after the Second World War really marks a turning-point in the history of Peruvian politics. First of all, the appearance of a new group of parties implies a profound change in forms of political activity: the choice between the APRA and the oligarchy, which was the only possibility between 1930 and 1956, now became a proper party system; in other words, the PAP, till then the only dominant and organized party, began to weaken and became more tolerant after 1956, giving way to a multi-party system. Given the very wide dispersion of votes, the system which was then established was based on a series of shifting alliances and compromises.

On the other hand, the appearance of the populist parties did not bring about any modification of the system of electoral representation, merely a slight expansion in participation, since the illiterate were still excluded from voting. Whereas



the population of the country increased by 63 per cent between 1940 and 1961 (growing from seven to eleven million inhabitants), the electorate grew from less than one million in 1945 to 1,575,741 in 1956, and then to 2,222,926 in 1962. The major part of this increase consisted of a floating electorate which neither the PAP nor the Communist Party, i.e. none of the parties in existence before 1956, had managed to assimilate. The populists did not attempt to win over the PAP's following, however, preferring to address themselves to the new middle strata (which after 1958 began to include some sectors of the peasantry). A map of electoral support thus emerged showing clear differentiations both according to region and to social following. The populists abandoned the north to the PAP; their aim was to capture Lima, the country's great electoral and economic centre, and also the centre and south.

Finally, to complete this brief sketch of the populist parties, some of their characteristic features should be underlined: caudillism; the important part played by the new middle class; a concentration on 'technical' solutions to social and economic problems; and the similarity in social composition between their electorates.

#### PARTIDO ACCIÓN POPULAR (AP)

##### *Origins and Formation*

The birth of Popular Action coincided with the sudden change in the political situation in 1956. Since General Odría's dictatorship was going through a period of crisis, the latter decided to relinquish power and organize elections. Eight years of political reaction (1948-56) thus came to an end in an unlooked-for fashion, with a lively election campaign, in which the PAP was not permitted to take part. At this very moment the political forces described above made their appearance on

the political scene. Some of these, including a number of 'dignitaries' just as violently opposed to the military dictatorship as to the Apristas' reintegration into politics, groups of professional people hoping for social change, and the middle classes sprung from the economic revival of recent years found a leader in the person of Fernando Belaunde Terry, principal of the Faculty of Architecture.<sup>7</sup> This nucleus of supporters put forward his candidature for the presidency as the best bet against Manuel Prado, secretly supported by the PAP, and General Odría's crown prince, Hernando de Lavalle. As will be seen, Belaunde adapted himself better to the main themes of the election campaign than his rivals.

Although the Popular Action party did not yet exist as such, a Belaundist electoral machine had already moved into action. In this embryonic phase of the party, still tainted with caudillism, the activity of the leaders of the bourgeoisie, the upper middle classes, and certain other groups such as the National Front of Democratic Youth and Left Social Action, who were to form the nucleus of the future party, could already be discerned. The Belaundist popular following was attracted largely by the dynamic campaign conducted by the young academic, who spoke all over the country, got the national electoral court to accept his registration, and in his speeches emphasized certain points of an ambitious programme of social renewal (land reform, oil nationalization), to sum up, demanded 'profound and immediate social change'. The multi-coloured alliance of this charismatic leader – top professional men and the other new electoral groups – ultimately accounts for the electoral success that marked the beginnings of Belaundism: 34.58 per cent of the votes, or 457,966, as against 567,713 (42.87 per cent) for Manuel

7. Perhaps Belaunde's youth (he was 44 years old in 1956) by comparison with his rivals attracted votes from the new electors and women voting for the first time. At the time of writing (1972) Belaunde is 60, Haya de la Torre 76 and Odría 74 years old.



Prado, supported by the PAP and his small personal following.

Electoral success, however, is not everything; the movement had to progress beyond this stage. In 1956, Belaunde himself founded the Popular Action party. This party remained in opposition between 1956 and 1962. In 1962, it made an attempt to win power. Finally, in 1963, its alliance with Christian Democracy enabled it to gain the votes it needed to beat the Apristas and Haya de la Torre; Popular Action won the elections, bringing its leader to the presidency.

From 1963 to 1967, the AP underwent all the hardships endemic to a party in power: the appearance within it of disparate elements which developed into special interest groups as a result of their administrative or financial connections; loss of popularity; and, in the background, the crushing weight of its leader, President of the Republic, in the party's internal counsels. The internal elections of the party, held in 1967 after the catastrophic results of that year's local elections, demonstrate that a powerful sector of the party machine is endeavouring to carve out an independent path for the party, which would mean that its fate is no longer irrevocably bound up with that of the present regime.

In order to complete this analysis, three significant episodes in the development of the Popular Action party should be considered: the nature of the 1956 electoral campaign and its main issues; the struggle for power between 1962 and 1963; finally the AP's attitude after 1963.

*The Electoral Campaign of 1956 and its Issues.* This campaign represented a clear break with any that went before it. The striking feature was that the initiative for it was taken by non-party groupings. Thus in 1955, a national coalition led by the industrialist Pedro Rosello (supported by

Pedro Beltrán's daily newspaper *La Prensa*) launched a 'pilgrimage of liberty', attacking General Odría and his associates in their own strongholds, Ica, Piura, Tacna, etc. In response to the activity of the plutocrats and the oligarchs of the coalition, the Apristas reacted: their General Secretary, Ramiro Priale, returned secretly to the country. However, other groups were mobilizing: the friends of Manuel Prado (who was then living in Paris), under the leadership of Manuel Cisneros Sánchez, editor in chief of the daily *La Crónica*, set up a Pradista electoral machine that worked very efficiently throughout the country. Subsequently Hernando de Laval, a lawyer representing a number of big foreign companies, and a director of the North American company Cerro de Pasco, who hoped to continue the General's work, launched an extremely expensive campaign on North American lines (with slogans like 'Laval's the one'). Finally Belaunde, whose family, if not one of the richest, was at least sufficiently old-established, made his appearance on the scene, thus giving the final touches to this election. An electorate with visible progressive tendencies was now obliged to choose a President and parliamentary deputies from among three 'dignitaries' (Prado, Laval and Belaunde).

The campaign thus acquired a new style, less dramatic than that of 1945, where meetings and public speeches (Haya is a consummate orator) played a decisive role. This time the campaign was very much an American-style affair: a profusion of posters, marches, the use of cars and loud-speakers, in short full exploitation of mass communications media. These features were further accentuated in the subsequent elections (where television had an important effect on the results in Lima and the coastal towns).

Some of the main battle-cries of the campaign were remarkable for their consistency, general interest and novelty: the rejection of dictatorship, return to legality, land reform, and economic and social development. The rejection of dic-



tatorship arose not only from a general disquiet at the 'fiddles' worked by the dictator and his associates, but also from a deep-rooted anti-militarism. As for the return to the rule of law, it showed the desire of these enlightened political followings, paradoxically enough created during the dictatorship, to return to a formal democracy; the weight of this electorate was to increase in the years to follow and helps to explain the stable and moderate tone of Peruvian politics over the last dozen years. Finally, it was now possible to speak openly of land reform, oil nationalization, etc.

Of all the candidates, Belaunde was the most at home with these themes. Lavallo in fact could guarantee neither the return to the rule of law nor rejection of dictatorship, since he claimed to be the representative of 'continuity'. Prado guaranteed the rejection of the military regime but not the return to legality, since he was supported by Aprismo, the eternal factor making for discord and violence; and in any case his programme did not contain any proposals likely to satisfy the social aspirations of the new electors. The desire for change did, however, help Belaunde. Although the subject of land reform had already been taken up by the APRA, the founder of Popular Action considered it from the practical – or according to his supporters, 'technical' – point of view. The new professional classes surrounding him regarded this pragmatism and absence of ideological preoccupations as a remedy and a response to Aprista messianic belief. Popular Action, therefore, by using the same rallying-calls as the APRA, appeared in 1956 in the shape of a kind of Aprista heresy – a heresy of the upper middle classes, the technocrats, the planners. A heresy which, unlike the APRA in 1931, avoided a frontal attack on the Church and on imperialism.

*The Struggle for Power: 1956–62, 1963.* Between 1956 and 1962, the opposition in the two Houses (Christian Democrats

and Social Progressives) included a small but active group of populist representatives. During the same period, Popular Action was beginning to establish itself, and its leaders met at a number of Congresses in the north, centre and south of the country. The architect Belaunde, leader of the party and its chief candidate in elections, covered the country with a team of technical aides, mostly recruited from among his sometime pupils. Belaunde and his advisers (*asesores*) developed a mystique constructed around the history of Peru and its glorious past, expressing confidence in the ability of the population to solve its own problems at local level (this was the origin of the programme of 'popular cooperation') and founding a cult based on the geography and landscape of the country ('Peru is its own doctrine'), for which he was bitterly attacked by doctrinaire Christian Democrats.

There is no doubt that Prado's mistakes and the difficulties experienced by the Apristas in adapting themselves to the unpredictability and complexity of the system of 'coexistence' for which they had opted improved the chances of the AP and its leader. In 1962, after Haya's hairbreadth victory (32.98 per cent of the vote as against 32.12 per cent for Popular Action), Belaunde revealed his connections with the military establishment, and especially with the violently anti-Aprista inter-services command. He called for intervention by the armed forces to counter the alleged 'electoral malpractice' of the Apristas. In reality, the Apristas had won the election perfectly fairly, thanks to their electoral strength in the north, where they obtained most of their votes. In July 1962 the country was taken over by a military junta. After some ups and downs (an internal coup in September 1962, withdrawals of General Bossio, and of General Pérez Godoy), the junta organized fresh elections. To win power, the AP used both its good relations with the military and with the other populist parties. While it consolidated its alliance with Christian Democracy, the junta undertook to clamp



down on the left-wing parties (many leaders were rounded up in a big sweep in May 1963). The dispersal of votes was thus avoided, and in 1963 Belaunde gained the victory over Haya de la Torre.

After 1963: from Nasserite Experiment to Super-coexistence. Belaunde's enormous popularity among the regular army officers can be measured by the 1962 military coup and the junta's subsequent activity. His most radical supporters were keenly aware of this, and dreamed of setting up a Nasser-style government, i.e. a government that would enjoy the support of the Army in its clashes with a parliament dominated by the PAP and the UNO. What could be simpler than to abolish the Houses, govern by decree, carry out the promised changes, including oil nationalization and the reform of agricultural land laws, and so forth? But the AP's leader, made wiser by his tenure of the presidency, gave his party 'hot-heads' (*termocéfalos*) to understand that he was 'President of all the Peruvians'. Gradually the regime moved towards a system of cooperation between the various powers and the parties (while Haya maintained that the supreme power in the state was the power of Parliament). The President's enemies were to call this system 'super-coexistence'.

However, Popular Action was to emerge the loser from this process. In the 1967 local elections, when the 'hot-heads' were expecting the party to win 70 per cent of the vote (as predicted by the journal *Oiga*, by Eduardo Orrego and others), it in fact lost some of its strongholds, including Arequipa, Tacna and Cuzco. Over the whole country, the electorate swung away from the regime and its party.

#### *Party Programme*

In the national interest, the party initially adopted a position near the centre of the political spectrum. 'The dilemma be-

tween capitalism and communism, between right and left, between Washington and Moscow, is frequently presented to our political organizations as an invitation to take a decisive step and opt once for all for one extreme or the other; we consider such a choice impoverishing.'

During the 1962 and 1963 election campaigns, Popular Action seemed to be moving towards left of centre. Apart from some general observations on imperialism (expressed in the party's Declaration of Principles), the AP gives the impression in its campaigns of a nationalist and democratic party that favours the application of immediate solutions to the land problem, the mining problem and the problem of the banks. At the same time, its programme emphasizes a point which may be considered the dominant feature of its ideology: the possibility of achieving social, democratic and peaceful development through the application of technology. After 1963, when the AP found itself in the seat of power, its nationalist slogans were somewhat played down in favour of the technocratic solution.

The AP's economic programme was constructed around three points: pragmatism, reformism and a measure of state intervention. Thus the AP came out in favour of land reform to eliminate the *latifundia*, but preserving the productive sugar and cotton plantations of the coast. Belaunde was opposed to a credit monopoly, and during his 'hundred days' (a term coined by his supporters to draw a deliberate parallel with Roosevelt) he set up a National Bank, and increased the reserves and the efficiency of the State banks. Finally, the party supported flexible planning, gradual decentralization (the 'emancipation of the villages') including a programme of 'popular cooperation', i.e. public works of local importance carried out jointly by the population and teams of students.

In foreign policy, its position was contradictory: it was faithful to the Organization of American States, favoured the revival of the Alliance for Progress, and toyed with the



idea of joining a Latin American Common Market. After the appearance of the guerrillas in July 1965, the party's anti-Cuban policy hardened.

### *Organization of the Party*

The party is organized on a national scale. Its highest governing body is constituted by a plenum elected at the party congress; this plenum consists of twenty secretariats and as many under-secretariats (political bureaux, domestic affairs, relations with the government, etc.). The party also has other bodies: an executive committee, a political committee and control committees for various special fields. The organization is divided into geographical units and also by sectors of industry. The most responsible post is that of General Secretary which comes up for election at every congress. Apart from these congresses, the AP organizes conventions, assemblies and more widely based meetings.

However, this democratic form of organization disguises a structure that is in reality autocratic. The problem may be summarized as follows: from the start, Belaunde surrounded himself, within the AP, with a group of people bound to him by ties of kinship, friendship or class.<sup>8</sup> Moreover this ruling clique belonged to the middle bourgeoisie which regarded Belaunde as its figurehead. While Belaunde's influence as party leader made itself felt from the first, after 1963 his power increased even more: for many party leaders with positions in the state machine, the leader of the party was at the same time the Head of State. Only when prodded by various threats (the electoral crisis resulting from the 1967 local elections and the proximity of the 1969 general elec-

8. Resignations tendered to the AP in recent years contain revealing details about the true chain of command in the party. See R. Letts Colmenares in the journals *Gestos*, February 1965, and *Figuras*, March 1965.

tion) did the party begin to react. The plenum elected at Cajamarca in 1967 was contrary to the tastes and interests of Belaunde himself; the General Secretary elected at that time was the 'land-reformer' Edgardo Seoane, ex-ambassador to Mexico.<sup>9</sup> Other leading personalities in the party include Eduardo Orrego, Juan José Vega, Raúl Pena Cabrera, all of whom were elected at the same congress; Oscar Trelles and Gastón Acurio.




Figure 16. Organigram of the AP in 1967

9. Edgardo Seoane was the author of the draft land-reform bill submitted to Parliament by the executive in 1963. Seoane also held the posts of Vice-President of the Republic and director of the National Office for Land Reform (ONRA). Both the draft bill and ONRA itself were severely criticized by opposition members of parliament and by the National Agrarian Society (a powerful farmers' and land-owners' association) and a war of words broke out between ONRA and its critics in the press. The bill that finally became law in 1964 was very heavily watered-down by comparison with Seoane's original draft, which was regarded as radical. Further, ONRA passed into



### The Problem of Power

Belaunde's professional training, his long stay in the United States, the absence of ideological preoccupations in the AP's highly pragmatic programme all contributed to creating Belaunde's private dream of getting the country 'on the move', and undertaking an ambitious public works programme (roads, factories, coastal or Amazonian highways, settlement of virgin lands). The weakness of these programmes, including land reform, lay in their dependence on international capital. As a result, the firmest promises made by Belaunde the candidate had prudently to be adapted to circumstances by Belaunde the President; the annulment of oil contracts (with the IPC at Talara) or the expropriation without compensation of the big estates could in effect lead to the drying-up of foreign credit or the adoption of exceptional measures by the Inter-American Development Bank or the International Monetary Fund, both big creditors of Peru.

the control of the Ministry for Native Affairs, which ensured greater parliamentary control over the institution given the task of putting land reform into practice.

Seoane was born in 1903; an agronomist and agricultural entrepreneur, he represented a new type of farming promoter. In charge of the big Mamape estates belonging to the Pucala Agricultural Association on the north coast, he revolutionized agricultural techniques. A Catholic, he first entered politics in 1956, standing as candidate for the post of Senator for Lambayeque, on the Popular Action ticket. In 1958 he visited Europe as a delegate of Peruvian Catholic Action. In 1960 he visited the north of Mexico to inspect the irrigation works there. In 1961 he was elected party candidate for the vice-presidency of the Republic at the AP's Congress at Iquitos. In 1962 he published a book on the agrarian question, *Surcos de paz*. In 1963 he became Vice-President of the Republic. When his land-reform schemes were blocked, he left as ambassador to Mexico, where he stayed until 1967. On his return to Peru, he was elected General Secretary of Popular Action.

### Electoral Strength

From the beginning, the AP's electorate proved remarkably stable; between 1956 and 1963 the AP remained the largest opposition party. None of the three major national elections brought any significant change (see table, p. 420).

The figures have to be treated with a certain degree of caution, however, as they do not represent Popular Action's net electorate. The Party's development and the skill with which Belaunde has placed it at the cross-roads of a number of different trends make analysis difficult. In 1956, for example, the Belaundist following was very fluid, and even included some Apristas; in 1962, part of the communist vote went to Belaunde; and in 1963 the Christian Democrats supported him.

### Areas of Support

The regions where the party was very strongly entrenched were primarily the industrial zone of Lima, Junín, a stock-farming area with a large native community, and the departments in the south where the Quechua-speaking population is in an overwhelming majority: Cuzco, Puno, Apurímac and Ayacucho. A third area should be added to these, that of Arequipa and Tacna, also in the south, but which has achieved a certain level of industrial and commercial development. The areas where the party was weakest were the northern departments, Huanuco and Pasco in the central *cordillera* and Ica on the coast.

The contradictions implicit in this distribution (with Lima on the one hand, the country's commercial and industrial centre, and the south, the most backward region, on the other) may be explained by the following hypothesis: the AP's programme attracted the urban classes by its insistence on economic and social development, and the Quechua areas by its promise to reform agricultural property laws, a slogan



which earned a particularly sympathetic response from the native communities in the centre of the country, the valleys of the Apurimac and the Cuzco and in the thickly populated border areas of Lake Titicaca.

The case of Lima and its relations with Acción Popular deserve a closer look. In 1956, Belaunde beat Prado in the urban zone of the capital by 161,778 votes against 159,163; but in the rural zone (Cajatambo, Canta, Cañete, etc.) where the APRA is strongly entrenched, Prado outdistanced Belaunde. However, the AP's electorate grew in subsequent years as the urban sector expanded, while the rural sector remained stationary. In 1962, Belaunde won 32.3 per cent of the vote in the capital, and Haya only 25.51 per cent (which was why he lost the general election, through Lima's very great electoral weight in the country), but in fact it was Odría who came first in the capital, with 36.54 per cent of the votes, or 234,242 votes out of 642,667; the shanty-town dwellers and some rich areas voted for the General. In 1963 Belaunde won back first place (38.03 per cent) and his electoral following remained faithful in the 1963 and 1967 local elections.

#### *Belaundist Following or Party Following?*

Being an electoral machine designed simply to attract votes for Belaunde's candidature (1956, 1962, 1963) the AP was much less fortunate in parliamentary elections, e.g. in 1962:

#### *Representation of the Various Parties in Parliament in 1962*

Parties	Deputies	Senators	Total
Alianza Democrática <sup>10</sup>	88	26	114
Acción Popular	62	16	78
Unión Nacional Odrista	31	11	42
Others	5	2	7

10. The joint Aprista and Pradista ticket in these elections was suppressed by the military junta.




Figure 17. Votes Cast for the AP in July 1963

In 1963, Belaunde was faced with the same problem: a Parliament in which the Apristas and Odristas were in the majority. Some elections, like those in Cuzco, give a good illustration of this duality in voting patterns: whereas



Belaunde won 61.27 per cent of the votes in 1963, his parliamentary ticket obtained a much lower percentage of the votes. In local elections, the situation is the same: in 1963, because Belaunde, in the first months of his presidency, restored elected councils, list four of the Alliance (DC-AP) obtained 747,000 votes (35.68 per cent), or a slight lead over the Coalition (PAP-UNO), which only won 33.98 per cent. But three years later, in the 1967 local elections, the Coalition defeated the Alliance, with 960,000 votes against 797,000. The AP following was highly sensitive to shifts in the popularity of the AP's leader, President Belaunde.

#### *Factions Within the Party*

A number of groups have broken away from the AP: thus in 1956 the Movimiento Social Progresista broke with AP and founded a new party. In 1964, another sector broke away from the party to follow Senator Villarán, organizer of the 1962 and 1963 election campaigns, who was dissatisfied with the President's weakness in the face of Aprista opposition, the pressure of the oil companies and groups of exporters. The Apristas seized upon these internal contradictions with delight; they pointed out the presence of mutually antagonistic forces within AP: 'They have new-style plutocrats side by side with old-fashioned leftists.'<sup>11</sup> Finally, in 1965 a group of younger members, including Ricardo Letts Colmenares, who had directed the popular co-operation programme, broke with the party.

None of these splits endangered the party's existence. However, as Letts himself pointed out after his resignation, many party members were dominated by their fear of losing a secure public appointment, stifled by the muzzle which helped to isolate the leader from his base, and paralysed by the 'presidential taboo'.

<sup>11</sup> Speech made in the House by Andrés Townsend.

#### *Alliances*

The party is formally allied to the Christian Democrats. In accordance with this alliance, the AP and the DC put forward the same candidate for the vice-presidency, a Christian Democrat, Mario Polar, who during Belaunde's presidency was the second Vice-President. The two parties also presented joint lists for parliamentary elections. On the other hand things did not always run so smoothly in local elections: in Callao, for example, a conflict arose between a mayor affiliated to Popular Action and a group of Christian Democrat local councillors. The agreement also included a joint plan for social reform.

Other, non-official alliances also existed. In 1956, 1962 and 1963 between Belaunde and the pro-Soviet leadership of the Communist Party, and with groups of Social Progressive advisers and technicians. Acción Popular was in fact the common meeting-point of all the various populisms except for Odrismo.

\*

Whereas politics were dominated by the APRA before 1956, this role was then taken over by Acción Popular. While the APRA represented the middle and working classes that grew out of the First World War, the AP embodied newer social groupings. The nature of the party was obvious, but its true function was less so. For some of its members, the party was primarily an electoral machine to bring their leader to the presidency and to give him constant support once he had acquired that position. Others claimed that the AP had a mission of redemption: like elections, the party ought to be the instrument of a profound transformation. The advocates of this revolutionary vocation did not shrink from demanding the introduction of emergency measures, including military intervention, to counter the malpractices



and obstructionism of the two Houses of Parliament. Belaunde attempted to maintain a balance between his 'palace counsellors' who preached collaboration with the parliamentary opposition and the 'hot-heads' who called for intransigence. AP's political stance oscillated between extreme intransigence at election times and an equally extreme flexibility when the party was in power.

#### PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (PDC)

##### *Origins and Development*

After 1945 a very active Social Christian nucleus appeared in the entourage of President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero. But the political flowering of Christian Democracy, like that of the other forms of populism, only dates from 1955. Bustamante returned to Peru (he had been overthrown by the military coup organized by General Odría) and, in the 1956 elections, the department of Arequipa returned some Christian Democratic senators and deputies. These were to provide the party's ruling group and original inspiration. They included Mario Polar and Hector Cornejo Chávez, while the ageing Bustamante became the party's *éminence grise*.

Between 1956 and 1962, Christian Democracy concentrated its activity on the parliamentary level. Its representatives' opposition to President Prado was skilful and dashing, but to the country it was an utterly unknown quantity. When the Christian Democrats put forward Hector Cornejo as a candidate for the presidency in 1962, he only won 2.88 per cent of the vote. Worse still, not one of its parliamentary candidates was elected. The military coup and the prospect of fresh elections gave it time to introduce a number of prudent changes, however. The trend in the party that favoured collaboration with the AP eventually triumphed, although not without meeting resistance and hostility from

the 'orthodox' group that tried to uphold the party's independence. At all events, it was partly due to Christian Democratic votes that Belaunde finally managed to break the electoral balance between the AP and the PAP and tip the scales in his own favour. Within the framework of the alliance, a number of Christian Democrats were elected to Parliament.

The Christian Democrat programme is nationalist, in favour of state intervention and community-minded. Without abandoning the moralizing tone which seems to be endemic in this particular political attitude, one group of intransigents advocated oil nationalization, a stricter fiscal policy, control of foreign capital, etc., in spite of the alliance with the AP.

##### *The Party's Role in National Life: Electoral Weakness?*

The party's chief problems seemed to stem from its electoral weakness. The mere 48,828 votes obtained by Cornejo Chávez in 1962 forced the party to make an alliance. But the local elections and the struggle for the mayoralty of Lima opened up new avenues of approach to them. One of the Christian Democrat leaders, Luis Bedoya Reyes, succeeded in 1963 in defeating both the PAP and the UNO in Lima, at a time when the latter had put up María Delgado de Odría, the General's wife who was very popular in the slum areas of the capital, for election as mayor. They repeated this success in 1967, when Bedoya defeated a serious contender for the mayor's office, the engineer Jorge Grieve, candidate of the PAP. Does this mean that there is a big Christian Democratic following in the city, or a personal following loyal to Bedoya, a very active mayor who has embarked on major projects of urban redevelopment, a great orator, a man of humble origins, enjoying great prestige among the population of the capital? It is still too early to say. In any case,



what should be emphasized is the crisis brought about by this electoral explosion achieved by the PDC.

In the end, the centre-right tendency grouped around Bedoya came into conflict with the hard-line sector led by Cornejo, and, when it proved unable to carry the day, broke away to create a new party, the Popular Christian Party (PPC). Orthodox Christian Democracy seems to have retained most of the party workers and the younger supporters, while the PPC devoted itself to winning a new Bedoyist following, but failed to make very impressive inroads on the old party. The most right-wing factions of the Christian Democrats were the ones that went over to the PPC.

#### *Areas of Support; Following*

The Christian Democrats do not possess a true faithful following, as does the Aprista Party or Popular Action. It attracts a certain number of women voters, usually from the urban middle classes, more susceptible to the personality of the party's leaders than to political argument. A long-standing anti-clerical tradition which has not entirely disappeared tended to operate against the Christian Democrats when they tried to canvass Catholic votes. Its areas of support are the same as, though weaker than, those of AP: Lima, the towns in the south and so on.

#### *Organization*

Small in number but well-organized, the Christian Democrats are directed by a national executive committee, regional committees, and bodies representing special sections (teachers, workers, youth, women). The supreme body of the party is the plenum. There was also a parliamentary group consisting of senators and deputies. Its principal leaders included Senator Hector Cornejo Chávez and Alfredo García Llosa,

Emilio Llosa Ricketts, Javier Silva Ruete, and Rafael Cubas.

#### MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL PROGRESISTA (MSP)

##### *Origins and Development*

This movement was born during 1956, like the other populist movements, but never managed to expand and gather strength like the AP, or even Christian Democracy. The importance of this party lay in its ideological role rather than in its chances of winning elections. In 1956 the Social Progresistas provided the basic framework of the Belaundist programme. Recruited largely from the professional class, their confidence in the power of technology, the social sciences and planning to solve Peru's problems brings them very close to the pragmatism of the AP.

The MSP soon found itself faced with a dilemma: should it become entirely integrated in the AP, or try to make its own way? In the end it chose the latter course. However, since they were unable to address the people in tones that were likely to be understood and had no leader with the range of a Belaunde, the Social Progresistas' election results (they presented a candidate for President in the 1962 elections, Alberto Ruiz Eldridge) have been catastrophic: 9,076 votes for the whole country, or 0.53 per cent of the electorate. They made no further appearance on the electoral scene, neither in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1963, nor in the local elections of 1963 and 1967.

##### *Disappearance?*

Other factors played as great or greater a part in the eclipse of *social progresismo* as their election fiasco. First of all, its sympathies oscillated between two opposite poles: solidarity with the Cuban revolution on the one hand, and eagerness



to put technocratic skills to immediate use on the other. In the former case, the radicalization of the Cuban revolution has made the principles of *social progresismo* (social humanism, planning) incompatible with the revolutionary Marxism of the Cuban revolution. Furthermore, Belaunde's accession to power appeared to a number of MSP militants as an opportunity to apply their scientific and technical talents at once to the solution of the nation's problems. In the end, whereas some moved leftward and joined a Peruvian branch of the Castroist movement (including Sebastián Salazar Bondy), others opted for technical cooperation with the ruling power. This cooperation indicated the gradual disappearance of the movement, which became a party of *éminences grises*. Its best-known leaders are Alfredo Ruiz Eldredge, Jorge Bravo Bressani, José Matos Mar, Augusto Salazar Bondy, Francisco Moncloa. The importance of these men was greatly increased following the military coup of October 1968.

#### UNION NACIONAL ODRISTA (UNO)

##### *Origins and Development*

Set up in 1961 by General Manuel Odría, the UNO occupies the far right of the Peruvian party spectrum. Its origins go back to the regime set up by General Odría after the coup d'état of 27 October 1948 (the *revolución restauradora*), which put a sudden and violent end to the democratic experiment undertaken by President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero with the support of the APRA and the Social Christians. A military junta held power until 1950, when elections were held, with a single candidate, Manuel Odría, who continued in office until July 1956. Before leaving the country, he gave his support to the candidature of Hernando de Lavalle in the elections held that same year; the latter

only obtained 222,916 votes against 567,713 for Manuel Prado (secretly supported by the APRA) and 457,966 for Fernando Belaunde.

However, far from falling, General Odría's popularity steadily rose between 1956 and 1962. In 1961, he was even able to return to Peru and organize the UNO, which became indisputably Peru's third biggest political force after the Aprista Party and Acción Popular.

This popularity may be explained first by the effect on the country of the great number of public works projects undertaken by the government between 1948 and 1956. Because of these, unemployment was greatly reduced and a number of new administrative posts were created at the same time. However, the international market situation (high demand for raw materials, especially minerals, as a result of the Korean War), which enabled a certain degree of wastefulness at government level, also encouraged increased speculation and the misappropriation of public funds, and produced a class of new rich, especially amongst civil servants, parliamentary deputies and local authorities. Manuel Prado's government therefore inherited a large domestic debt at a time when the foreign economic situation was becoming much less favourable. This only reinforced the myth of abundance associated in the public mind with the government of the strong man of the period, General Odría. The UNO was therefore able to find a double base – one popular, the other consisting of the financial and commercial bourgeoisie.

##### *Areas of Support; Following*

The popular base included the new social groups which had arisen largely as a result of population expansion, economic and social changes, and migrations from the sierra to the coast, or from the coast to the capital. These were all groups



which had not been assimilated by the so-called doctrinaire parties. The following chief categories may be distinguished:

*Inhabitants of the Shanty-towns (barriadas).* In 1962, General Odría won a plurality of the votes in Lima, while he only came third over the country as a whole. In Lima, he won 234,242 votes (or 36.54 per cent), thus beating Belaunde (32.34 per cent of the vote) and Haya de la Torre, third with only 25.51 per cent of the vote. Lima's most underprivileged areas (the *barriadas* of San Martín de Porres and Rimac) voted for him, as did the working-class area of Victoria, despite its traditional left-wing bias. In 1963, Lima remained the political centre in which the UNO obtained the greatest number of votes proportionately to the rest of the country.

*The Conservative Vote in the Provinces.* In the last two elections (1962 and 1963) the APRA and the AP contended for first place in every department in the country, with the UNO usually only managing third place, except in three departments: Piura (on the north coast) and Tacna (on the south coast), both classic illustrations of the nature of the Odrista vote, and Callao.

In Piura, the UNO obtained 36,000 votes, as against 19,043 for the AP-DC Alliance and 19,545 for the APRA. The dam and irrigation works undertaken on the Quiroz River during the years of Odría's dictatorship played an important part in the election: the small farmers and day-labourers of the upper and lower Piura thus rallied to the support of the General. Moreover the authoritarian aspects of the UNO programme did not provoke the same hostile reaction in this area as in most other departments. In Piura (one of the richest departments in the country, with cotton plantations and oil wells) the relations between rural workers and the big landowners are tinged with paternalism, with a system of rewards and sanctions quite outside the framework of the

law, and thus bear a resemblance to the kind of relationship established between General Odría and the rest of the country when he was in power. Under this system, leaving political parties out of account, the judiciary, Parliament and so on were all left to the good will of 'paternalism'.

The UNO's most striking characteristic in Tacna is its practically 'irredentist' nationalism. Tacna is the frontier department between Peru and Chile; during the dictatorship a number of major public works projects were carried out there, with the specific object of demonstrating to neighbouring Chile the wealth and power of Peru. Tacna thus remained faithful to the ex-dictator's work in the elections.

*Odría's Restauradora' (Restorationist) following.* Like a number of his predecessors, General Odría found it necessary, once in power, to create an official party. This was called the Peruvian Restoration Party (Partido Restaurador del Perú), an allusion to the restorationist revolution of 1948. The creation of this party enabled General Odría to place a number of leaders loyal to the government in key posts in the trade unions (from which Aprists and Communists were excluded) and to control middle-class organizations; the chief object of this party was to serve as intermediary with the ruling power. Its following (the restorationist following) consisted in part of state employees, and partly of families of humble origin to whom the regime had accorded – as a special favour – a job, free medical treatment or other similar services. Since public services and the national income increased considerably at this time, it must be admitted that quite a large number of people were affected by the 'generosity' of the restorationist regime.

Other groups still belonged to the Restoration Party's following: first of all the new middle class which had appeared between 1951 and 1956 and made its pile in speculation in property and exchange, or through extortion; secondly, the



traditional exporting oligarchy, which could hardly help associating itself with a regime which attacked the Aprists, then in revolt, coincided with a period of increased demand for exported goods, and instituted complete freedom of exchange within the country.

The restorationist following with its dual origins, popular and bourgeois, was therefore to integrate perfectly with the Unión Nacional Odrista which took over from the old party in 1961.

#### *Party Programme*

Apart from a few basically conservative principles like 'the defence of the Catholic faith' and guarantees to investment capital, the UNO's programme hardly differs from that of the other parties, in that it aims for 'social justice' and 'the struggle against underdevelopment'. In actual fact, the party's programme is indissolubly bound up in the public mind with the prestige attaching to General Odría's achievements in power. Besides the rather pragmatic approach indicated by the party programme, some mention should be made of the disdain felt by UNO and its followers for democratic procedures; the idea that the party system is synonymous with inefficiency lies at the root of this feeling. Authoritarianism therefore rejects the Liberal system and its institutions in the name of efficiency. The UNO's rallying-calls are of the type, 'You can't eat democracy', and 'Deeds not words'. Ideology is therefore despised, to the advantage of an authoritarian minority composed of ex-army officers and Creole executives and managers, that takes advantage of a political following recruited from the most underprivileged and unstable strata of Peruvian society; an extremely simplistic programme is perfectly adapted to the wishes of both the elite and the following surrounding General Odría.

#### *Party Organization*

As has already been indicated, authoritarianism and the cult of personality are the dominant features of the UNO. The party does possess an organizational structure nevertheless, despite the preponderant role played in it by General Odría. The UNO is in principle directed at the top by a national executive and a consultative committee; the leadership is kept in touch with the base through shop and area committees. Apart from General Odría himself, the chief personalities in the UNO are Julio de la Piedra, leader of the parliamentary party and also party chairman; María Delgado de Odría, the General's wife; Victor F. Rosell, Eduardo Villarín and David Aguilar Cornejo.

A 'Renovation Front for National Action' has recently been set up in Lima. This group has gathered under its banner a number of one-time restorationists resentful of the UNO's playing second fiddle to the PAP, including some ex-ministers in General Odría's government, G. Augusto Villacorta and Juan Mendoza Rodríguez, and also some ex-deputies from the period of the Odrista dictatorship. An organizing committee has apparently already been set up.

#### *Electoral Strength*

The 222,619 votes collected by Hernando de Lavalle in 1956, before the UNO was set up, provide the first indication by which to judge the group's electoral strength. In 1962 General Odría, the UNO candidate, obtained 28.44 per cent of the vote, or 481,404 votes, of which 234,000 were won in the capital. In 1963 this percentage dropped to 23.69 (463,085 votes).

The peculiar position of the Odrista movement, entrenched in the capital and its surrounding shanty-towns and in the departments where the dictatorship had carried out major



public works projects (Piura and Tacna) provided the UNO with a following recruited both from the most dynamic industrial sectors and the most conservative agricultural regions (Valle de Piura, Ica, etc.). Thus the underprivileged from Lima's shanty-towns, and some categories of minor officials as well, united by a common nostalgia for the old system of caciquism, joined the Odristas.

The party has been relatively successful in elections. The UNO is the third most powerful electoral force in the country, and in the last elections managed to increase its representation in Parliament; in 1962 it held a total of forty-two seats (thirty-one deputies and eleven senators). In 1963, in alliance with the PAP under the badge of the People's Coalition, it won a clear majority in the two Houses. In 1967 the Coalition reaped benefits from the growing unpopularity of the Belaundist regime, and won 967,000 votes in local elections, compared with the 797,000 obtained by the alliance between Popular Action and Christian Democracy.

### The Extreme Left-Wing Parties

From 1928 to 1956, the only extreme left-wing organization that was well entrenched in Peru was the Communist Party (if we except the revolutionary phases of the PAP). However, there has been a proliferation of left-wing formations in recent years. An analysis of the causes of this phenomenon is outside the frame of reference of this work. It will suffice to indicate briefly some of the external causes, such as the de-Stalinization process and its major ideological repercussions, the influence of the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, and some of the internal causes, such as the appearance of middle-class and progressive bourgeois parties (the AP and Christian Democracy) concerned to achieve immediate social




Figure 18. Votes Cast for the UNO in July 1963

improvement, the appearance of a mass peasant and worker movement, the radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie (university students and intellectuals), and the appearance of a small but devoted extreme left-wing following. It is appro-



priate to include some social factors, such as the crisis affecting the big property-owners in the Andes, the constant migration of labour, and the expansion of the working class through the development of industries like metallurgy, mining and fishing. On this social and political basis, some minority sectors have acquired a revolutionary consciousness and provide varying recipes for practical action.

#### PARTIDO COMUNISTA PERUANO (PCP)

##### *Origins and Development*

Like other communist parties, the PCP was an offshoot of a socialist party, founded in 1928 by the writer José Carlos Mariátegui. The pressures exerted by the Third International, the relentless struggle against the emergent APRA and the arrival in Peru of Eudocio Ravines, the party's new general secretary, resulted in its official transformation into a communist party. A group of dissidents formed a small socialist party with some local strength, following the line taken by L. Castillo.

It was under Ravines's leadership that the PCP endeavoured to turn itself into a working-class party. However, the tradition of libertarian socialism and anarchism among the more advanced workers led more naturally to the development of Aprista trade unionism, and despite its strenuous efforts to halt the trend the PCP was gradually overtaken by the Aprista CTP. Banned on several occasions, it took part in the 1954 elections in a Democratic Front, together with the PAP, supporting Bustamante's candidature. In 1948 it was again declared illegal. Although article fifty-three of the Constitution, which prohibits international parties, in principle prevents the party from participating in public life, it was in practice tolerated in the 1956 and 1962 elections, and also took part in the local elections of 1963 and 1967.

The same tolerance enables it to publish a periodical, *Unidad*, and to have communist representatives at trade-union meetings and conferences; its members are permitted to travel freely inside the country and abroad. This ambiguous situation means that its leaders, in the absence of any legal status or recognition, may be arrested at any time, and its offices sacked; but at the same time it is enabled to maintain a precarious existence.

##### *Party Programme*

While the PCP's ultimate objective is the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party leadership is currently preoccupied by other more immediate problems. Some of the more important tasks set down by the third and fourth national congresses of the party are: to gain control of the trade unions, still for the most part in the hands of the 'yellow' CTP; to take part in trade-union activities (especially though the medium of the National Liberation Front); and to create alliances with non-communist anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical forces of democratic and nationalist leanings. The PCP supports the Cuban revolution and fights for the cause of world peace and peaceful coexistence. The core of the party's founders which has opposed the PAP over the years today forms the pro-Soviet faction in the party.

The existence of a national bourgeoisie opposed to imperialism and amenable to negotiation represents a key factor in Peruvian politics where the Communist Party is concerned. It should be emphasized that this is one of the points of major disagreement with the pro-Chinese faction, the various Castroist movements and the Trotskyists. Belaunde's identification with the national bourgeoisie enabled the communists to enter into the elections of 1956 to 1963 with a good conscience.



*Organization*

The party is organized on the same lines as other communist parties, and conforms to the principle of democratic centralism: local cells, regional committees (of which Lima has the largest), and a central committee; there is a number of allied organizations – youth sections, women's sections and so on. Intellectuals, artisans and a few workers predominate among the party's leaders. The party's publications appear fairly regularly, and it puts out numerous pamphlets.

*Role in National Life; Electoral Strength and Areas of Support*

Despite its 'illegality' and the absence of any leader of national standing, the PCP has always had a part to play in the life of the nation, either by supporting the claims of the workers or by intervening in one way or another in elections. It was represented at the CTP's reinauguration in 1956, in particular through the regional federations in Arequipa and Cuzco, which it controls. Belaunde was supported by the communists in 1956, and received especially strong electoral support from them in the south. In 1962 the PCP put forward L. Castillo as its own candidate, a move which ended in complete fiasco: 16,766 votes were obtained, or 0.99 per cent of the total. At the same time, however, a proportion of communist voters supported the FLN candidate, who obtained 34,595 (2.04 per cent), while others supported Belaunde. In 1963, when the party was not able to stand at the elections, its voters certainly gave their support to Belaunde. Finally, in 1963 the party obtained 40,121 votes in local elections.

The PCP is supposed to have about 10,000 members. This figure is difficult to check, and it is likewise difficult to measure the degree of prejudice aroused by its disputes with

the FLN, the pro-Chinese faction, and other left-wing groups.

The influence of groups of intellectuals (especially in Cuzco and Arequipa), the fact that the PAP has been unable to win political supremacy in the region, the existence of groups of workers and artisans influenced by the anarcho-syndicalism of the 1930s all help to explain the communists' strength in the south. In recent years, the PCP's influence has extended to the peasants of the south, to Lima and Callao, and the industrial areas of the centre and south (Croya, Toquepala, Tacna), and it is now just beginning to acquire the dimensions and breadth of support of a national party.

The party's chief leaders are Raúl Acosta, a printing worker and the party's general secretary; Jorge del Prado, an intellectual; César Lévano, a journalist; and Gustavo Valcarcel, a writer.

*FRONTE DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL (FLN)**Origins and Programme*

Set up in December 1961 with the immediate concrete objective of 'intervening in the national elections', the National Liberation Front first appeared as a simple front organization of the Communist Party. However, in 1962 the party was torn between supporting General Pando, the FLN candidate, Luciano Castillo, a socialist, and even Belaunde. Analysis of the ballot papers shows that the 34,599 votes then won by Pando and the FLN amounted to double the number obtained by the socialist Castillo, and that departments such as Ancash, Arequipa, Junín, Pasco and Callao were particularly strongly attracted by the Front. The latter organization then drew up a nationalist and progressivist programme, whose immediate minimum claims were the



nationalization of oil, land reform and the restoration of full civil and political liberties; its long-term objective was to win the country's 'second independence', that is to say to put an end to dependence on the outside world and to imperialism. The two leading lights of the FLN, the priest Salomón Bolo Hidalgo and the journalist Genaro Carnero Checa, are fervent supporters of the Cuban revolution, a cause which they often preach at public meetings.

#### *The FLN's Role in the Life of the Nation*

The FLN is the result of a movement to organize and give precise (principally electoral) aims to a new left-wing following which, although not integrated in the PCP, adopts a distinctly anti-reformist line. The state of mind and general attitude of this 'non-partisan left' which flocks into the public squares to listen to the highly popular Father Bolo are the result of demographic, social and cultural changes which have taken place in modern Peru and of the influence of Castroism. However, this potential following, consisting of students, the unemployed, migrants, and the lower classes generally (or provincial exiles living in Lima) prefers on the whole to give its votes to other candidates, seeing in this their only hope of achieving concrete results. It is therefore probable that the FLN supporters voted for Belaunde in 1962 instead of for Pando, who had no chance, in order to avoid a split vote which would inevitably have carried Haya to the presidency. This explains the apparent paradox that FLN candidates for parliamentary seats won more votes than its presidential candidate. In the 1967 local elections, the Front won 40,000 votes in the capital. This means that about 7 per cent of the Peruvian electorate may be classed as left wing, so that despite its disagreements with the PCP (especially violent in 1964) the FLN has managed to retain a role,

consisting in expanding and making the most of the left-wing vote.<sup>12</sup>

#### THE PRO-CHINESE FACTION: PARTIDO COMUNISTA MARXISTA-LENINISTA (PCML)

The principal leaders of this group, Saturnino Paredes and F. Sotomayor, are still continuing the struggle to win over the party apparatus. Although they have had some success with a few groups (the Young Communists, some committees and cells in Lima, and the native communities of central Peru because of their close ties with the barrister Paredes), the pro-Chinese communists have not succeeded in supplanting the 'old guard' of pro-Soviet leaders in the party apparatus. They publish their own daily, *Bandero roja*, and are trying to branch out into areas neglected by the traditional communists, notably the trade unions and the Indian peasant organizations. However, the principal working-class areas such as Arequipa, Oroya, Callao and Lima, which by their nature provide the chief bases of the party's support, are still controlled by those leaders who are faithful to the Moscow line.

In 1965, when a number of guerrilla detachments were set up, a considerable proportion of the youthful members of the Chinese faction joined the National Liberation Army (ELN), a secret military organization which regards itself

12. The increase in the left-wing vote has upset the right, which hopes to make some changes in the electoral law to halt the gradual but steady advance. In 1962, Pando obtained 2.04 per cent of the vote; in 1963, the appeal to voters to abstain put out by left-wing parties, prevented from taking part in the elections by the repressive measures of the junta, was heeded by 4.79 per cent of the electorate. Finally, in the 1967 local elections the extreme left wing obtained more than 10 per cent of the vote (with the support of a number of independents).



as the 'mailed arm of the revolution'. The guerrilla group led by Héctor Béjar was for example part of the ELN.

#### MOVIMIENTO DE IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR)

##### *Origins and Programme*

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) has very different origins from those of the other extreme left-wing groups. At first, the MIR called itself Apra Rebelde, and was in reality the old left wing of the PAP. The break occurred in 1959, at the third Aprista Congress, when Luis de la Puente Uceda, then a prominent member of the party leadership, put down a motion of censure which quite simply called in question the whole policy of 'coexistence'. This criticism of Haya's policy brought about the instant expulsion of Luis de la Puente and his friends, who set up an Aprista Committee for the Defence of Doctrinal Principles. Having broken away completely from PAP party tutelage, and with the idea of identifying itself with Castroism, in 1960 the APRA Rebelde became the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

The MIR then published its minimum programme, which expressed a number of general claims (an amnesty, true land reform) and represented a thorough recasting of the Aprista programme of the 1930s: it aimed at the re-establishment of a united front against imperialism. However, Luis de la Puente and his friends subsequently declared themselves convinced of the impotence of electoral action to achieve these aims and the inevitability of armed conflict, and also of the impossibility of achieving development in Peru under the leadership of the national middle class. These ideas were proclaimed publicly by Luis de la Puente in a demonstration in San Martín Square in Lima, set down in the party's *Basic Principles* published in 1960, and reaffirmed in the articles

and editorials in the movement's journal, *Voz Rebelde*. Curiously enough, however, neither the left nor the regime took its promise of 'setting the Andes on fire' very seriously.

##### *Guerrilla Activity. Future of the Movement*

In July 1965, the MIR put out a revolutionary proclamation which announced the creation of a number of guerrilla centres in the Andes. The manifesto bore the signatures of Luis de la Puente, General Secretary of the movement, Guillermo Lobatón, commander of the central area, Ricardo Gadea for the southern zone and Gonzalo Fernández Gasco for the north. The Army soon found Luis de la Puente near Cuzco, in the Mesa Pelada region, and Lobatón was seen in the central area in the course of various attacks on police detachments, big estates and bomb attacks on bridges. Once these two guerrilla command centres had been eliminated, that in the north broke up of its own accord, and the MIR seemed doomed to disappear. However, although the movement's best-known leaders fell in the struggle, not all of them disappeared.

#### THE TROTSKYIST PARTIES: PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO (POR) AND THE FRENTE DE LA IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA (FIR)

The activities of the small group of Peruvian Trotskyists led by Ismaél Frías are almost completely confined to the most highly developed sectors of the working class (the metallurgy workers in La Oroya, for example). With its party cells, its very advanced level of trade-union organization, and the waves of strikes and claims which it instigates, the Peruvian POR's line does not differ appreciably from that of Trotskyist movements in other countries. The greater degree of success won by Peruvian Trotskyism is attributable to the



Hugo Blanco experiment in the valley of La Convención and to the fact that it is still affiliated to the Fourth International and has close ties with Argentine Trotskyism, despite the pressures imposed by other left-wing groups. Blanco first came into contact with Trotskyism while a student of agronomy at Buenos Aires. After 1962, Blanco set up the Frente de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (FIR); this movement rejects peaceful forms of struggle, follows the Cuban example and makes strenuous efforts to unite the forces of the left.

Blanco's achievements may be summarized as follows: in 1958 he discovered a spontaneous trade-union movement among the peasants in the valley of La Convención (Cuzco), and set about giving it a political aim and direction. This was so successful that by 1962 these unions (of which Blanco had by now become general secretary) dominated the valley, expelling the landowners and establishing their own political sway. The phenomenon bears some resemblance to that of the 'Self-Defence' areas in Colombia. Although the movement spread over the whole of the southern part of the country, it was brought to a halt by the capture of Blanco and the prosecution of the main peasant leaders who had supported him. Blanco's example, the manner in which he was able to control the peasant masses and the great admiration he commanded, provided a great boost to the Peruvian Trotskyists' trade-union activities. The latter are just as firmly opposed to the 'legalist' road chosen by the communists as were the guerrilla fighters of the MIR and the National Liberation Army.

#### The Military Coup of October 1968 and its Political Consequences

On 3 October 1968 the rules governing the political life of Peru changed yet again. The armed forces removed President




Figure 19. Changes in the Votes Cast for the Various Parties 1962-3

Belaunde from the Palacio de Gobierno and closed down Congress for an indefinite period. Political parties were permitted to exist but the purpose of their activity became somewhat uncertain. The chief of the Army's general staff, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, was successively proclaimed head of the ruling military junta and subsequently President of the Republic, a position he has retained ever since.

The coup was actually organized by a group of colonels.






Figure 20. Results of the July 1963 Elections: Relative Weight of Each Department

NOTE: Two towns have been isolated. Callao, the port of Lima, is in an area of very high density in terms of registered electors, but must be shown separately because it has only 100,000 voters. (98.9 per cent of the population are illiterate.) Loreto, on the other hand, in the centre of an immense underpopulated region is the only place in the area of any electoral significance.




Figure 21. Votes Cast for the PAP, UNO and AP-DC in July 1963: Three Main Regions

Their intentions were highly political and went far beyond a mere response to an admittedly deteriorating institutional situation. The architects of 'Plan Inca', as their conspiracy was called, have largely controlled the policies of the



Peruvian government since the coup, although they have respected the prevailing system of seniority and generally have not entered the top posts over the heads of generals. It was only in 1970 and 1971, as the colonels became generals, that the leaders of the coup emerged to public view. However, they have kept a close watch on the policies of the cabinet through the powerful *Comité de Asesores a la Presidencia* (COAP). The COAP is made up of serving officers and many of its leading members have gone on to cabinet posts.

The ideas of the colonels corresponded, in very broad terms, to those of the orthodox Christian Democrats or even of the Social Progresistas. They had been among the supporters, from within the armed forces, of Belaunde in the 1963 election and had believed that he would be able to implement the reforms described in his election manifesto. The shipwreck of this programme in Congress and the progressive collapse of the Belaunde regime, highlighted by the final split in 1968 between sections of *Acción Popular* loyal to Belaunde and those led by Edgardo Seoane, drove the colonels to despair of any progress under the existing political system. There was no one with any prospect of victory in 1969 whom they felt they could support. This view of Belaunde's regime was quite common even among generals who were not actually involved in the conspiracy. General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, who subsequently became foreign minister under President Velasco, said privately in 1967 that the Army had lost confidence in Belaunde because he was gutless and had not achieved the reforms the country had hoped for and needed.

Apart from the disappointment felt at the failure of the Belaunde administration to come to grips with the country's problems – problems which had hardly changed since APRA had first emerged as a reformist party more than forty years ago – there were a number of other factors, which helped the

advocates of a coup d'état to win acceptance for their plans, both within the armed forces and among civilian sectors.

(1) The years of Belaunde's presidency had been characterized by a series of scandals, involving ministers and other public officials. Several of these cases, eagerly raked over by the press, had either involved or come close to involving members of the armed forces. Many senior officers felt that the spread of corruption could destroy the effectiveness of the armed forces. The example of Cuba under Batista was frequently cited and there was a strong feeling that the problem could not be tackled with Belaunde in power.

(2) The splits in *Acción Popular* and *Democracia Cristiana* made it almost certain that APRA would hold the key to the 1969 elections. Among older officers and in the more traditional sectors, APRA was still anathema on historical grounds dating back to the 1930s. To the young reformists, who were planning the coup, APRA was contemptible for having sold out to the oligarchy in 1956. Whatever the reason, a possible APRA victory in 1969 was viewed with suspicious gloom by the armed forces. Although it was probably true to say – as General Julio Doig said in March 1967 – that there was no longer a military veto against an APRA electoral victory, it was also true that the prospect was sufficiently unwelcome to contribute greatly to the acceptance of a coup in circles where it might otherwise have been opposed.

(3) The immediate excuse for the coup – to which relatively little importance need be assigned – was the government's bungling management of the settlement with the Standard Oil subsidiary, International Petroleum Company. Although the question is unlikely ever to be completely clear, it seems improbable that there was an eleventh secret page to the agreement signed between the government and the company. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of intrigue and collusion with foreign interests, which was indisputably gen-



erated by the affair, did contribute to popular acceptance of the coup.

(4) A growing number of young intellectuals, especially those grouped in the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, believed that representative democracy was structurally incapable of coping with the problems of integrating the masses – both in the countryside and in the slums of the cities – into the economic, political and social life of the country.

Since coming to power, the military have not bothered to suppress the political parties, although with Congress closed and no prospect of national or municipal elections, the traditional politicians have little room for organizing a popular base. In some senses the political scene is freer than it was before. The Partido Comunista's Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos has achieved full recognition for the first time since 1948. Apart from the communists, APRA has probably survived the eclipse of parliamentary institutions better than the other non-revolutionary parties, which are really quite irrelevant today. If for some reason – at present unforeseeable – the military regime were to collapse in the way in which the Argentine military regime has done, it seems certain that APRA would be the party which would be able to dominate any subsequent elections.

The rump of the Christian Democrats, the wing of Acción Popular opposed to Belaunde, and the Social Progresistas, provide the backbone of civilian support for the regime – but as individuals rather than as political parties. The military has studiously ignored the old framework of political life and is attempting to build a new framework through the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo de la Movilización Social (SINAMOS). This was set up in June 1971 under the direction of General Leonidas Rodríguez, who was then commander of the key Lima armoured division. As head of SINAMOS, Rodríguez was given a seat in the Cabinet and

was thus effectively the only minister with command of troops. He lost his division at the end of 1971, but remains an extremely important figure. SINAMOS has direct responsibility for seven other organizations which were previously answerable to either the President or the Prime Minister. These are:

The Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Jóvenes (ONDEPJOV) (Pueblo Joven is the official euphemism for the slums which ring Lima and other coastal cities.)

The Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo Cooperativo (ONDECOOP)

Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo Comunal (ONDECOM)

Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Económico (FNDE)

Dirección General de Promoción Comunal

Dirección de Organizaciones Campesinas

Dirección de Promoción y Difusión de Reforma Agraria

These organizations, many of whose functions overlapped, will soon disappear in SINAMOS. However, there are few clues yet as to how SINAMOS will develop into the democratic instrument which its promoters have promised. Many of the most radical young Peruvians of the past decade – including the guerrilla leader Héctor Béjar and the writer of the historical portion of this chapter, Hugo Neira – are now working for SINAMOS, and there can be no doubt that they are seeking radical solutions to age-old problems. Whether participation without political parties is a realizable goal will not be known for many years. Even if the military government does not suffer from the kind of institutional erosion which has afflicted other military governments, both in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, it could be twenty years before APRA effectively and finally withers away. Nevertheless, the functions of SINAMOS are likely to change the shape of Peruvian politics permanently. It will clearly be the instrument through which the present government will try to deal with the country's



most pressing rural and urban problems. It is unlikely that the machinery will be dismantled easily if it has begun to operate in any meaningful sense.

Meanwhile, opposition to the government persists among many businessmen. This is not orchestrated through any organized political movement, and finds expression only in the pages of *El Comercio* and *La Prensa*, morning papers that are both querulous and rather frightened. APRA is behaving with a good deal of circumspection, but has remained strong throughout the north, fairly consistently defeating leftist candidates in union and university elections.

Among the revolutionary groups, Héctor Béjar and other former members of the ELN now back the government. The MIR has merged into the Vanguardia Revolucionaria and Ricardo Letts has assumed its leadership. It is by far the best organized and strongest leftist group opposing the government at the present time. Hugo Blanco, following his release from jail – together with all other political prisoners – in December 1970, began to organize peasants to demand their rights within the framework of the new agrarian reform laws. Early in 1972 he was expelled from the country.

February 1972

HÉLÈNE GRAILLOT

## Uruguay

### The Political Background

Despite its small size (about 72,172 square miles), Uruguay holds a strategic position on the banks of the River Plate and has long been the object of rivalry between contending foreign powers: first the Spanish and the Portuguese, then Argentina and Brazil (not to mention Great Britain) made successive attempts to annex her. Thanks to British intervention, based on that power's concern to protect its trading interests on the River Plate by creating a buffer state there, Brazil and Argentina finally signed a treaty in 1828 recognizing the independence of the eastern coastal province, thus marking the birth of the east-coast republic of Uruguay. The country's hard-won independence was followed by protracted civil wars; the longest of these, the Guerra Grande (1839–51), ended in the division of the country into two blocs, the ancestors of the two main political parties of today. The armed confrontation between the two camps (Colorados, or Reds, against the Blancos) lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century. As in Argentina, it was during this troubled period, despite everything, that the bases for Uruguay's future prosperity were laid down. Large-scale European immigration also contributed in no small measure to the population and development of the country.

Uruguay is a unitary state, indeed it is perhaps over-centralized; Montevideo, the political, economic and administrative capital, contains almost half the total population,